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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation consists of three studies related to accounting disclosure at the 
interface of the organization and society.  The first study investigates the overlapping 
perspectives of legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and 
stakeholder theory and integrates these theories into a more cohesive meta-theory of the 
organization-society interface.  The second study examines whether a corporation’s 
charitable contributions represent a corporate social performance strategy or a 
legitimation strategy.  More specifically, study two investigates, from two competing 
perspectives, how corporate executives rationalize their philanthropic actions.  The third 
study analyzes the relationship between the current tax laws and the fulfillment of 
corporate foundations’ social functions. Taken together, these three studies build upon 
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The role of business in society is a vital public policy issue in contemporary 
debate, and much of its currency comes from the scale and influence of the modern 
business corporation.  As business entities have become one of the most dominant 
organizations in society, more people are concerned with the role and accountability of 
business (Preston & Post, 1975; Frederick, 1978).  The actions of influential businesses 
affect the lives of individuals in many aspects and shape the prosperity of communities 
and the condition of their environments. The society in general expects business entities 
to perform their economic functions legally and ethically as well as to be socially 
responsible (Carroll, 1979).   
Although Friedman (1962) argues the only social responsibility of business is to 
make a profit, business entities voluntarily undertake many social activities that may not 
necessarily bring direct financial benefits to the firms (Hillman and Keim, 2001).  Among 
the different social activities performed by corporations, charitable contributions are 
perceived as the top of the pyramid of corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 1979; 
1991), and as one outcome of corporate social performance (Wood, 1991).  Moreover, 
there have been efforts to extend business reporting into a wider context.  In addition to 
the traditional financial information, Gray et al. (1997), Elkington (1999), and others 
advocate to include business social and environmental performance into business 
accounting and reporting.  The U.S. Congress proposed to require corporations to 
disclose their charitable contribution activities within their financial statements (Gillmor 
and Bremer, 1999).   
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Issues pertaining to interactions between organizations and society and the 
usefulness of business social disclosure/reporting are of interest to academia as well as to 
many stakeholders.  Thus, this dissertation aims to provide comprehensive theoretical 
explanations and empirical evidence on these issues through the development and 
execution of three studies.  Each study is discussed separately in the following three 
sections. 
Study One  
Legitimacy Theory, Institutional Theory, Resources Dependence Theory, and 
Stakeholder Theory: Are They Commensurable? 
 
  Study One investigates the overlapping perspectives of legitimacy theory, 
institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder theory and integrates 
these theories into a more cohesive meta-theory of the organization-society interface.  
This study concludes that even though the four theories are different in their levels of 
analysis and resolution, they are much the same.  They share one common objective—to 
explain how organizations survive and growth.  These theories imply that financial 
performance and efficiency may be necessary but not sufficient for business entities to 
reach their goal of continued existence and growth.  This meta-theory offers an 
explanation of why business entities voluntarily undertake social activities, why business 
social performance may or may not necessarily be rewarded by financial benefit, and why 
the overall numbers of social activities undertaken by corporations tend increase.  The 
commensurability of these theories provides a sound theoretical foundation to 
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substantiate the value of social and environmental accounting research because firms’ 
undertaking of social activities is crucial for them to maintain their societal legitimacy.  
 
Study Two 
Corporate Charitable Contributions:  
A Corporate Social Performance or Legitimacy Strategy? 
 
Study Two examines whether a corporation’s charitable contributions represent a 
corporate social performance strategy or a legitimation strategy.  More specifically, study 
two intends to understand or explain, from two competing perspectives, how corporate 
executives rationalize their philanthropic actions while their corporations are 
concurrently facing other business-related social issues such as poor evaluations of their 
employee relations, environmental performance and product safety records. 
From a corporate social responsibility/performance perspective, Carroll (1979) 
classifies business social responsibility into four categories: economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary responsibilities.  He argues that business entities must first focus on 
meeting their economic, legal and ethical responsibilities; placing their discretionary 
efforts such as philanthropic giving as secondary concerns.  Based on this conceptual 
framework, corporate charitable donations are expected to be negatively associated with 
firm-specific problems (e.g., poor performance records) with employee relations, product 
safety and environmental performance. If this postulation holds, corporate charitable 
contributions would be a fair representation of business social performance. 
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Conversely, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Dowling and Pfeffer, (1975) and others, 
posit that charitable contributions are a means of legitimating business activities.  These 
researchers argue that the amount of contributions would be expected to change over time 
or contexts to the extent that a firm’s legitimacy or social acceptance is more or less 
problematic.  This argument is consistent with the finding of legitimacy-based 
environmental disclosure research that found that firms with a poor environmental 
performance record tend to make more extensive mitigating environmental disclosures 
(Patten, 2002).  In accordance with this legitimation assumption, the relationship between 
corporate charitable contributions and firm-specific problems with employee relations, 
product safety and environmental performance is expected to be positively related.  If this 
postulation is supported, the perceived merit of corporate charitable giving could be 
misleading.    
Study Three 
Current Tax Laws and the Fulfillment of Corporate Foundations’ Social Functions: 
Evidence from 990-Returns of Private Foundations 
 
Study Three analyzes the relationship between the current tax laws and the 
fulfillment of corporate foundations’ social functions.  A corporate foundation is a tax-
exempt private foundation that is funded by a business entity, but is legally separated 
from its sponsoring company.  Currently, corporations may deduct charitable 
contributions, including donations to their sponsored foundations, up to 10 percent of 
their modified annual taxable income (Internal Revenue Code Section 170(b)(2)).  
Because of this favorable tax treatment and other advantageous tax provisions for private 
 4
 
foundations, many firms establish corporate foundations to manage all or some of their 
donations (Himmelstein, 1997).   
The social function of private foundations is to some extent different from that of 
traditional charities.  While the role of traditional charities is to provide relief to the 
underprivileged, and to lessen the burdens of government, the functions of foundations is 
to fund leading research that may bring alternative solutions to social and public policy 
issues and explore new and uncharted directions in which society may move (Andrews, 
1965; Zurcher, 1972; Roelofs, 2003).  However, funding activities pertaining to social 
and public policy issues are more controversial and vulnerable to criticism than donations 
to traditional charities (Mcilnay, 1997).  Thus, corporations may hesitate to fund 
contentious social programs, such as Planned Parenthood projects, through their private 
foundations.  Business entities tend to avoid any involvement with social controversial 
issues because, as reported by Roberts (1992), corporations with foundations are more 
proactive in building good relationships with various stakeholders.  Moreover, current tax 
laws neither differentiate the functions between foundations and charities nor require or 
provide any incentive for foundations to fund research and public policy studies.  In other 
words, firms received the same tax benefit and perhaps similar degree of name 
recognitions when donating to either foundations or charities. 
As a result of the discussion presented above, study three hypothesizes that 
corporate sponsored foundations give a significantly higher amount of grant monies to 
charities than they give to research and public policy studies.  The findings of study three 
have important public policy applications because if current tax laws do not facilitate 
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foundations to fulfill their social functions, amendments to tax provisions for private 
foundations appear to be desirable.  
Overall Contribution 
Taken together, studies one, two and three, of this dissertation offer several 
significant contributions.  First, and for most, this dissertation presents a comprehensive 
meta-theory of the organizations-society interface.  This meta-theory provides a strong 
theoretical foundation to sustains and advance social and environmental accounting 
research because firms’ participation in social activities is necessary for them to maintain 
their societal legitimacy.  Second, this dissertation provides empirical evidence on the 
functions of corporate charitable contributions and corporate sponsored foundations in 
the interactions between organizations and society.  All these empirical findings have 
public policy implications.  Corporate charitable contributions are generally perceived as 
an outcome of corporate social responsibility.  This dissertation tests whether a 
corporation’s donations represent a strategy of corporate social performance or a 
legitimation strategy.  The results of this inquiry provide empirical evidence to the 
ongoing debate over the relevance of corporate charitable contributions disclosure.  
Finally, this dissertation also suggests that amendments to the current tax laws regarding 
private foundations appear to be necessary because current tax laws do not promote 
foundations to fulfill their social functions.  In the remainder of this dissertation, each of 
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LEGITIMACY THEORY, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY, RESOURCES 
DEPENDENCE THEORY AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY:  
ARE THEY COMMENSURABLE? 
 
Legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are considered the most influential 
theories within the domain of social and environmental accounting research.  As Gray, 
Kouhy and Lavers (1995) state, to treat legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory as two 
totally distinct theories would be incorrect because they are two overlapping theories that 
are different in their levels of perception and resolution rather than two competing 
theories.  In other words, both legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are interested in 
organizations and societal interactions but their approach to decomposing this complex 
social phenomenon are different.  In addition, Mathews (1993), Gray et al, (1996), and 
Deegan (2000, 2002) review a number of theories, and the notion of legitimacy appears 
to be relevant to other theoretical perspectives, such as institutional theory, resource 
dependence theory and stakeholder theory.  For example, when Pfeffer and Salancik 
(2003) updated their resource dependence theory, they reemphasized legitimacy as the 
fundamental resource on which any organization depends for continued existence.   
To what extent do legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence 
theory and stakeholder theory overlap?  Do these theories provide different foci of 
explanation for similar social phenomena?  Is it possible to synthesize these theories and 
if so would a synthesized theoretical model provide us with a better understanding of the 
organization-society relationship?  Because of the slightly different but useful insight 
provided by each theory, in this study I attempt to integrate these theories.  More 
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specifically, this paper explores how these theories can inform and be built upon by one 
another, and attempts to integrate these theories into a meta-theory of the organizations-
society interface. 
 This study provides several significant contributions to the accounting literature.  
First, many accounting scholars (e.g., Mathews, 1993; Gray et al, 1995, 1996; and 
Deegan, 2000, 2002) agree that there is considerable overlap among a number of social 
and organizational theories and the possibility of making “compatible interpretations of 
evidence from these different theoretical perspectives” (Gray et al., 1995, p. 55).  
Furthermore, Gray (2002, p703) emphasizes that “we need even greater meta-theory” to 
sustain and advance social and environmental accounting research.  This is the first paper 
that attempts to synthesize these theories into a meta-theory.  Second, legitimacy theory, 
institution theory, resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory are all important 
theoretical frameworks that seem to have significant influence in accounting and 
organizational research.  These theories, however, have been applied and taught as 
separate perspectives in research and in business and accounting doctoral student 
education.  This paper will be a valuable reference to researchers as well as to doctoral 
students who are interested in understanding the concepts and potential applications of 
each individual theory and the relationships between and among them.  Most importantly, 
we may see a richer (perhaps better) picture of social phenomena from this integrated 
lens than can be attained through relying on one theory alone.  Thus, this integrated meta-
theory should help position different sub-streams of research within a broader perspective 
and create a new path for future accounting research and programs.   
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This study concludes that although these theories are diverse in their levels of 
analysis and specificity, they are commensurable.  They share one common goal—to 
explain issues of organizational survival and growth--and most importantly, these 
theories recognize that economic performance and efficiency may be necessary but not 
sufficient to reach the objective of continued existence and progress.  From an 
institutional legitimacy perspective, legitimacy and institutionalization are synonymous.  
From an organizational legitimacy perspective, resources are a medium or representation 
of legitimacy.  From a stakeholder perspective, the dynamic nature of legitimacy is 
amplified and legitimation requires two-way communication and a mind-set of 
compromise between the organization of concern and its stakeholder groups. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows.  The next section begins with 
a brief discussion of the notion of incommensurability and presents an overview of the 
theories.  The following section provides a detailed discussion on legitimacy theory by 
bringing some of the recent critical discussions on legitimacy and corporations in the 
management literature into accounting research.  The notion forwarded by legitimacy 
theory would then serve as an overarching concept as I try to understand the relationships 
between and among these theories.  An application of the study result is then discussed 
and limitations are presented in the final section of this study.  
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Commensurability and an Overview of the Theories 
 The theories1 that are of interest in this paper are legitimacy theory (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995), institutional theory2 (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; 2003), and stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995). 
Commensurability  
 One fundamental issue to be addressed prior to integrating these theories is the 
commensurability among them.  The notion that scientific paradigms are 
incommensurable was forwarded by Kuhn (1970) in his book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. The term “incommensurability” in philosophy refers to the idea that 
different paradigms, or theories from competing paradigms, may appear to contradict 
each other but because of fundamentally different philosophical foundations, they cannot 
be meaningfully compared.  Kuhn (1970) states competing paradigms employ different 
criteria of acceptability for scientific explanations.  Thus, it is impossible to compare the 
validity of scientific paradigms from a neutral standpoint.  There are two main grounds of 
incommensurability:  
 Ontological incommensurability: ontological assumptions are concerned with the 
position of reality in one’s being. In other words, it raises questions about whether reality 
is simply given or a product of the mind.  The former perspective is referred to as realism 
                                                 
1 These theories have roots in other theories and have been applied by researchers in various academic 
disciplines and thus there are several versions of original ones. It is not the objective of this paper to review 
all versions of the theories.  
2 This is sometimes also called “new” or “neo” institutional theory. 
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which views the external social world as real and composed of concrete, hard, and 
tangible structures that separate the social world from the individual’s perception of it.  
On the other hand, the latter perspective is referred to as nominalism, which sees the 
external social world as relativistic and composed of mainly names, labels, and concepts 
that enable individuals to communicate.  In nominalism, there is no ‘real’ social structure 
beyond one’s mind.  
 The mindset between these two different worldviews also often influences one’s 
assumptions regarding the resources of knowledge, the relationship between individuals 
and their environment, and the appropriateness of research methodology3.  Given these 
different viewpoints, there is no common way to perceive the world.  Thus, there is no 
common measure that can be used to make unbiased judgments between paradigms. 
 Semantic incommensurability: the terms and concepts of scientific theories in 
different paradigms are not mutually intertranslatable (Sankey, 1993).  Scientific terms 
from different traditions or paradigms have different meanings.  The meaning of a term 
depends on its role within a theory.  Moreover, even if the exact word is used, the same 
term in different theories and different paradigms may not have the identical reference.  
Therefore, theories cannot be directly compared if the terms they employ do not share the 
same meanings or references.  In other words, the change in the meaning of theoretical 
terms from one paradigm to another provides the other ground for incommensurability. 
 According to these two criteria above, the theories examined in this paper are 
commensurable because they share a similar ontological view, and the references of their 
terms are almost identical. All of these theories are considered to be system-oriented 
                                                 
3 See Kuhn (1970) for detailed discussions. 
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theories4 (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Thompson, 1967; Gray et al., 1995, 1996), these theories 
assume any organization is influenced by the society in which it operates, and, in turn, the 
organization also influences society.  Organizations work within such interdependencies 
to reduce uncertainty and to ensure survival and growth.  Thus, these theories have a 
shared ontological worldview that they see reality/structures are continually created, 
reproduced and reoriented by the interactions among social organizations. And such 
interactions become constitutive of their province of meaning or having the power to 
enact and establish social meanings. These theories neither perceive that reality is purely 
given nor deny the existence of social structures.  Their worldview seems to situate in the 
middle ground of the spectrum between realism and nominalism.5,6  The semantic 
commensurability of the terms used in these theories will be discussed in detail through 
out the paper.  The core concept of each theory is summarized below. 
Overview of the Theories   
Legitimacy theory (Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995) focuses on whether the 
value system of an organization is congruent with the value system of society, and 
whether the objective of organizations is to meet social expectations or to gain social 
                                                 
4 “Open systems” is the term used in management literature.   
 
5 Their ontological view is similar to Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory. 
 
6 In addition, each theory focuses on a particular aspect of this interdependency and may have a slightly 
different attitude toward the effect of the social-political environment on organizations.  The human nature 
assumption is a continuum with determinism on one end and voluntarism on the other.  Determinism 
assumes that the actions of organizations are controlled by the external social-political environment.  On 
the other end of the spectrum, voluntarism views that organizations have the freedom to select their own 
actions.  Legitimacy theory does not declare a human nature assumption but views the value system as 
socially constructed.  Institution theory tends to be deterministic but both resource dependence theory and 




acceptance.  Legitimacy theory, however, is neither specified on how the congruency 
could be reached nor how the actions should be formulated.   
Institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) began 
much like legitimacy theory but concentrates on the relationship between environment 
and organizations, especially the stability and survival of organizations.  While 
legitimacy theory itself does not specifically express how to meet social expectation and 
gain social support, institutional theory strongly emphasizes that organizations can 
incorporate institutionalized norms and rules to gain stability and enhance survival 
prospects.  Thus, conformity to these established institutional patterns is the pathway to 
legitimacy, and to receive support and attract resources.   
Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 2003) also focuses on 
the effects of environment on organizations. However, instead of concerning itself with 
social expectation, resource dependence theory attempts to explain the effect of 
environmental constraint on organizations.  Resource dependence theorists state that 
organizations must engage in exchanges and transactions with other entities for various 
resources.  Because organizations are not self-contained or self-sufficient, they rely on 
their environment for support, and the core of the theory focuses on how organizations 
gain access to vital resources for survival and growth.  Resource dependence theorists 
believe that although organizations are constrained by their situations and environment, 
organizations possess both the desire and the ability to negotiate their positions within 
those constraints through various tactics. 
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995) is also concerned with the 
effect of environment on organizations.  However, as opposed to the other theories 
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treating the ‘environment’ as a whole, stakeholder theory focuses on the relationships 
between organizations and its various stakeholders who constitute the environment.  This 
holds true because stakeholder theory recognizes that (1) the impact of each stakeholder 
group on the organization is dissimilar, and (2) the expectations of different stakeholder 
groups are not only diverse but also sometimes conflicting.  Thus, how to receive 
support/approval from different influential stakeholders rests upon the ability of 
organizations to balance these conflicting expectations. 
According to the summaries above (see figure 1-1), it seems that as these theories 
attempt to analyze a complex social occurrence into simpler ones, each of them focus on 
a different level of analysis or a different level of perspective.  The levels of perspective 
range from (the highest level of) societal value system to (the lowest level of) stakeholder 
expectation.  Legitimacy theory seems to have a higher level of analysis than institutional 
theory, followed by resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory.  And as a result, 
legitimacy theory has the lowest levels of specificity on the issue of concern followed by 
institutional theory, resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory.  However, they 
have a shared goal—to explain how organizations survive in a changing society. 
The Theories and Their Relationships 
Legitimacy Theory 
 Accounting researchers (e.g., Patten, 1992, 1995; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; 
Walden and Schwarts, 1997; O’Donovan, 1999, 2002; Deegan et al., 2000, 2002) have 
used legitimacy theory as an explanation of the motivation behind voluntary 
environmental disclosure of corporations.  Although legitimacy theory provides a 
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foundation for understanding certain managerial actions such as environmental 
disclosures, the theory, as it is currently applied, is still in need of refinement (Deegan, 
2002).  The challenge of legitimacy theory in general, and in explaining the rationale of 
corporate environmental disclosure specifically, is that the term has been widely used but 
loosely defined.  This is not a problem of the theory itself, and the same situation could 
be equally applied to other concepts as well (e.g., see Roberts and Mahoney (2004) on the 
use of stakeholder language).  Suchman (1995, p572, emphasis in original) observes this 
situation and states that “many researchers employ the term legitimacy, but few define it”.  
Failure to adequately define the concept has also led Hybels (1995) to comment that 
legitimacy has been used as a “blind man’s hammer” by social scientists to shelter their 
careers and disciplines.  What is legitimacy? And what does legitimacy theory explain, 
describe and/or predict? 
Legitimacy and Legitimation 
Lindblom (1994) argues that we must first distinguish between legitimacy and 
legitimation.  The former is a status or condition and the latter is the process of obtaining 
the status or condition.  Lindblom (1994, p.2) defines legitimacy as: 
… a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system  
is congruent with the value system of the larger social system of  
which the entity is a part.  When a disparity, actual or potential, exists 
between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy. 
 
Organizations are perceived to be legitimate if they pursue socially acceptable 
goals in a socially acceptable manner; given this normative quality, performance and 
economic efficiency alone are theorized to be insufficient to obtain or maintain the status 
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(Epstein and Votaw, 1978).  Thus, legitimacy is not synonymous with economic 
achievement or legality because economic success is just one facet of legitimacy, and 
legality is theoretically an enforcer, not a creator, of changes in social values (Lindblom, 
1994, Deegan, 2002).  In addition, whether or not the goals and actions of an organization 
are legitimate (desirable, proper, or appropriate) within the socially constructed value 
system depends upon the social audience who observe them (Suchman, 1995).  The 
actions of an organization may deviate extensively from societal norms yet the 
organization retains legitimacy because the divergence is unnoticed.  Thus, “legitimacy is 
possessed objectively, yet created subjectively” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).  In other words, 
legitimacy is a conferred status that is always judged and controlled by others rather than 
by the legitimating organization.  As for legitimation, Maurer (1971, p 361) states 
“legitimation is the process whereby an organization justifies to a peer or superordinate 
system its right to exist.”  Thus, legitimacy grants rights not power to organizations.  The 
processes of financial report environmental disclosure have been theorized and 
empirically verified as a tool of legitimation (Lindblom, 1994, Patten, 2005). 
Institutional Legitimacy and Organizational Legitimacy 
From the above definitions of legitimacy and legitimation, two systems are 
identified; these are social system and organizational system. The social system is 
theorized at a higher and more abstract level of analysis than is the organization system. 
Organizations have the tendency to reconcile (in fact or in appearance) their systems with 
the higher order system through the process of legitimation.  As mentioned previously, 
legitimacy theory itself does not prescribe how the congruency between the two systems 
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can be achieved.   As a result, Gray et al., (1996), Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Suchman 
(1995) and others state that there are (at least) two major camps of legitimacy theory —
institutional legitimacy and organizational (or strategic) legitimacy.7 These camps differ 
in their understanding of how the congruency is reached or how the legitimating 
organization justifies its position.   
From a societal perspective, institutional legitimacy is used to investigate 
what/which institutional structures and activities as a whole (such as capitalist economic 
structure, democratic government) have gained social acceptance. These established 
structures, activities and procedures are used as the base line to evaluate whether the 
legitimacy-seeking organization adheres to these expectations, like legitimated 
institutions.  For instance, in order to gain social acceptance as a typical business 
institution, corporations would have an accounting department in their organizational 
structure, and then the accounting department would prepare financial statements for their 
shareholders.  Whether or not such structure and activity would ensure or enhance the 
reliability of accounting information is not the concern of institutional legitimacy.  This 
path of legitimation reinforces the legitimacy of the already institutionalized system--a 
capitalistic society in which our analysis of the social and organizational relationship is 
situated.    
The other camp is called organizational legitimacy or strategic legitimacy 
research.  Authors in this camp attempt to identify different strategies that organizations 
seeking legitimation may adopt.  Work in this strategic camp (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; 
                                                 
7 Gray et al. (1996) place these two perspectives under political economy theory.  They name the former 




Oliver, 1991; Lindblom, 1994) often adopts a managerial perspective (a narrower 
perspective) and emphasizes the ways in which organizations instrumentally manage and 
deploy suggestive symbols in order to gain social acceptance and support.  It is from this 
perspective that most social disclosure accounting research tends to draw its 
understanding of legitimacy (e. g. Deegan et al., 2002; Patten, 2005). 
From Abstract to Observable 
Although legitimacy and legitimation are theorized to have concrete 
consequences, they are both abstract subjects based on abstract logic.  As a result, a 
number of theoretical questions have emerged.  For instance, legitimacy and 
institutionalization appear to be synonymous, but to what extent or under what 
circumstance is this relationship sustained?  Second, is legitimacy itself a survival 
resource or is resource flow itself a representation of legitimacy?  Third, legitimacy is 
subjectively evaluated by observers.  Who are these observers and how can organizations 
identify them and identify with them?  
Hybels (1995) critically reviewed the use of the legitimacy concept and argues 
that although abstraction sometimes is necessary in theory building8, well-specified 
representation of the abstract concepts of social value, rules and norms may be 
identifiable.  He stresses that the representation of these abstract concepts may be 
revealed through detailed observations of institutions’ structures, actions and resource 
flows among constituencies (stakeholders).  Hybels (1995) argues that theories are 
developed to describe and to a certain extent to predict social-organizational behaviors, 
                                                 




and social phenomena are supposed to be observable.  For instance, observations of our 
governmental structures inform others and us that this society values democratic 
government systems in which citizens have the right and freedom to elect their leaders.   
Each time as citizens cast their votes, their actions signify their support for this social 
value and norm.  Observibility is an important element of these theories.  Thus, the next 
section discusses how the concepts forwarded by institution theory, resource dependence 
theory, and stakeholder theory may each provide certain observable traces of the abstract 
construct of legitimacy.  The center of these observable traces may be different as the 
levels of perspective of these theories narrow down.  By so doing, I argue that these 
theories can be integrated into a meta-theory as they inform and are informed by one 
another. 
Legitimacy and Institutional Theory 
 The concepts of institution and institutionalization have evolved over time from 
creating social reality to granting social acceptance (legitimacy).  The early concept of 
institutionalization emerged as Berger and Luckmann (1967) addressed the nature and 
origin of social order.  They argue that social order is fundamentally based on a shared 
social reality that is created in social interactions.  Social order comes into being as 
individuals take actions, interpret those actions and share with others their interpretations.  
Scott (1987) defines institutionalization as the process by which actions become repeated 
over time and are interpreted with the similar meanings among society members.  The 
process of institutionalization creates social meaning and reality for social members to 
communicate and for the establishment of social order.   
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 Berger and Luckmann (1967) emphasize that institutionalization involves three 
stages: externalizations, objectivation and internalizations.  For instance, we have socially 
created the time scheme (twenty four hours a day, seven days a week and twelve months 
a year) for ourselves but as this human product became institutionalized, it turns into a 
reality that seems external to us.  Our daily activities are scheduled according to the time, 
as if it is externally set.  We use the schedule to determine where to be and what to do as 
an objective measurement, and then we take this measurement result internally to 
evaluate our performance and plan our lives.  This situation appears to be what Berger 
and Luckmann (1967) observe in which we are capable of producing a world that we 
later experience as something other than a human product.   
The social realities that are established through the process of institutionalizations 
have become something known as tradition—the way things are or the way things are to 
be done.  These traditions or way of life are observable but often become invisible to 
individuals who immerse in these social patterns.  Weber (1946) states that tradition is an 
element of legitimacy because social actors are more likely to accept or approve the 
activities and decisions that they are familiar with.  This early version of institutional 
theory placed particular emphasis on the traditional character of institutional rules and 
beliefs as shared social reality and on the processes by which organizations tend to 
become instilled with value and social meaning.  
 As the theory evolved, the focus of institutional theory has also moved from the 
establishment of social reality to the institution of modern organizations.  In this shift of 
direction, there is less emphasis on institutionalization as a distinctive process of social 
reality and more focus on the pattern of organizational behavior and the conformity to the 
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pattern (Scott, 1987).  The work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) both investigate a common question—what makes organizations so similar?  They 
observed that many dynamics in the organizational environment stem not from 
technological or material imperatives, but rather from social norms, symbols, beliefs, and 
rituals.  They conclude that rational individuals make their organizational structures, 
functions and operations increasingly homogeneous not necessarily to increase efficiency 
but to meet social expectation or to be socially acceptable.  Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
state that organizations do not conform to a set of institutionalized beliefs because they 
constitute reality; organizations are strategically doing so because they are rewarded with 
increased legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities. 
Institutionalization and Legitimacy   
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three types of processes (coercive, 
mimetic and normative) that might cause an organization to arrange its structure in ways 
that conform to a formal institutional pattern.  Coercive process arrives from 
governmental regulations.  Mimetic approach happens when new organizations embrace 
the system of the existing institutions in their field.  Normative process occurs when 
organization administrators intuitively follow the conventional practices.  Scott (1977, 
1992) defines structures as indicators of an organization’s socially constructed capacity to 
perform specific types of functions.  Moreover, Meyer and Rowan (1991, p50) state that 
institutionally prescribed structures convey the message that an organization “is acting on 
collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner.”  However, Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) also create the term “ceremonial conformity” to argue that the 
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organization might adopt certain highly visible and salient practices that are congruent 
with social expectations while leaving the fundamental operations of the organization 
intact.9        
If legitimacy is said to stem from some socially constructed system of values, 
norms, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995), then conformity to this system grants 
social acceptance.  In other words, in order to be perceived as legitimate organizations, 
the pattern of organizational structures and actions is assumed to follow the prescription 
of these socially constructed norms and principles.  As a result, the feature of the socially 
constructed value system is supposed to be institutionalized into every aspect of 
institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Meyer and 
Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1987).  Parsons and Smelser (1956, p102) define institutions as “the 
ways in which the value patterns of the common culture of a social system are integrated 
into the concrete action of its units.”  This line of reasoning may have led many 
researchers (e.g., Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995) to suggest 
that conformity to the structures and rules of a preexisting institution is the easiest way to 
obtain legitimacy because sustained institutional patterns must already have the 
characteristic of legitimacy.  From this perspective, Suchman (1995, p576) states 
“legitimacy and institutionalization are virtually synonymous. Both phenomena empower 
organizations primarily by making them seem natural and meaningful.”   
                                                 
9 For example, the socially constructed structure for business Ph. D. programs in the United States is 
basically consisted of two years of course work followed by dissertation, which is different from the 
programs generally structured in Europe.  Thus, in order to demonstrate that they are capable of carrying 
out quality academic research education, U.S. business Ph. D. programs usually adopt (or adapt to) a 
particular set of structures.  The usefulness of this type of program arrangement is not uncontestable, yet 




The perspective of institutional theory is narrower than that of legitimacy theory.  
Instead of examining directly the value system of the society, institution theory views the 
pattern of the established institutions as the symbolic representation of the social value 
system.  In addition, the resolution provided by institutional theory is clear---   
conformity is the basic managerial tactic for organizations seeking legitimation.  It is 
interesting to note that while accounting researchers in the domain of environmental 
disclosure tend to rely on legitimacy theory to frame their studies, institutional theory is a 
preferred lens for many other aspects of accounting research such as auditing (Carpenter 
and Dirsmith, 1993), accounting profession (Fogarty, Radcliffe and Campbell, 2004), 
accounting systems (Covaleski, Dirsmith and Michelman, 1993), accounting regulation 
(Bealing, Dirsmith and Fogarty, 1996; Hunt and Hogler, 1993), and change in managerial 
accounting (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Burns and Scapens, 2000).  Some of these studies 
examine how institutionalization confers legitimacy and some critique the value of such 
processes.  It seems that well-established (institutionalized) accounting practices and 
regulation are more likely to associate with institutional theory, and the emerging 
accounting procedures such as social/environmental reporting, on the other hand, are 
more likely to be based upon the notion of legitimacy. 
Although institutional theory offers a reasonable tactic to legitimacy, Gray et al., 
(1996) argue that this type of legitimation practice indeed strengthens the legitimacy of 
the current social system (e. g. capitalism).  Thus institutional theory is capable of 
describing the reinforcement of the existing condition of legitimacy but is insufficient to 
explain the changes in social expectation or the dynamics of legitimacy.  For instance, 
why business corporations might start caring about environment and community issues.  
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Apparently, other theories are needed to provide us with a comprehensive understanding 
of this social occurrence. 
Legitimacy and Resource Dependence Theory     
 Several researchers (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Deegan, 2002; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003; Suchman, 1995) agree that legitimacy is like any other resource that 
organizations seek for continued existence.  Suchman (1995, p576) views “legitimacy as 
an operational resource that organizations extract—often competitively—from their 
cultural environments and that they employ in pursuit of their goals”.  This view appears 
to be consistent with the notion of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; 2003), which emphasizes that whatever resources are vital to the survival of an 
organization; the organization will pursue strategies to ensure the continuing supply of 
the resources.  With this overlap, it is reasonable to further explore how legitimacy theory 
and resource dependence theory are related. 
 Legitimacy theory, institutional theory and resource dependence theory are all 
interested in the relationship between organizations and their environment.  Legitimacy 
theory stresses the necessity to avoid any threat to an organization’s legitimacy, while 
institutional theory suggests conformity to the pattern of institutionalized organizations is 
the pathway to legitimacy.  Both theories, however, are less specific on the consequence 
of being or not being legitimate.  Resource dependence theory, in contrast, addresses the 
effect of legitimacy.  Instead of using the abstract expression “legitimacy”, resource 
dependence theorists have chosen the less abstract term “resource”, which explicitly 
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proposes the objective for an organization in its interaction with its environment is to 
obtain resources.    
 Resource dependence theory was introduced in the book The External Control of 
Organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  This book explored how organizational 
environments affect and constrain organizations and how organizations respond to those 
external constraints.  The book contained three central themes.  The first, and perhaps the 
most essential theme is that social context mattered.  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, 2003) 
emphasize that organizations rely on one another’s support and resources to carry out 
their functions.  This resource reliance makes the external control and constraint of 
organizational behavior both possible and almost inevitable.  Thus, analyzing the 
environmental situations in which organizations are located and the pressures and 
constraints that stemmed from those situations would provide us with a better 
understanding of organizational decisions and behaviors.   
The second theme reveals resource dependence theorists’ ontological view.  They 
believe that even though organizations are constrained by their situations and 
environment, strategic choices are still available and possible for organizations to pursue 
their goals.  Indeed, they emphasize that the environment is not only a given condition to 
be absorbed, avoided, or accepted.  Environment itself is the dynamic outcome of the 
interactions of many organizations seeking their own goals and interests.  When 
organizations face manageable uncertainty and external constraint, they may search for 
arrangements or form alliances with others to coordinate their actions.  Empirical studies 
based on this theory have investigated how organizations strategically managed their 
external constraints through selection of employees (Salancik, 1979; Pfeffer and 
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Leblebici, 1973), compositions of boards of directors (Pfeffer, 1972a; 1973; Peng, 2004), 
and business mergers (Finklestein, 1997; Pfeffer, 1972b; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976)10.  
Furthermore, when faced with unmanageable interdependence, organizations would seek 
to use the greater power of the larger social system and the government, using tactics 
such as political actions, to alter the environment for their needs. 
The third main theme of resource dependence theory is the emphasis on power 
rather than on economic efficiency.  From a resource dependence perspective, some 
organizations have more power than others because of the asymmetries of their 
interdependence and their location in social space (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  Theorists 
argue that the government is an important source provider for many organizations such as 
schools, health care, and government project contractors.  These organizations depend 
more on the government for resources than the government relies on them for supplies.  
The differences in the degrees of interdependence and social position grant the 
government more power than the organizations.  As a result, these organizations are more 
responsive to governmental regulations and policies (Salancik, 1979; Pfeffer and 
Leblebici, 1973).  The theory concludes that building close relationships with critical 
power organizations that control vital resources is a crucial strategy for continued 
existence.   
Since the publication of The External Control of Organizations, the empirical 
work that applied resource dependence perspective has primarily focused on transactional 
interdependence (Salancik, 1979; Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973; Pfeffer, 1972ab; 1973; 
                                                 
10 Little recent work is cited because research that applied resource dependence theory in recent years has 
concentrated more on networks and alliances (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  Networks and alliance are more 




Finklestein, 1997; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999).  For instance, 
the relationship between the possibility of merger and the amount of financial 
transactions between firms. Hence, the major theoretical challenge and critique of this 
theory is that resource dependence, with its focus on transactional interdependence, 
overlooks many other essential environmental impacts on organizations.  Pfeffer and 
Salancik (2003, p.xx) acknowledge this omission in the preface of their updated writings 
and explicitly claim that resource dependence was originally developed to provide an 
alternative perspective to economic theories of organizational decisions and actions, and 
“resource interdependence accounted for everything about organizations.”   
The relation of resource dependence theory to studies of legitimacy is clarified in 
the recent reissue of the original resource dependence text (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). 
In this update, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) stress that a benefit of studying firm strategies 
in a resource dependence tradition is the ability to consider the externally-oriented, non-
market based actions that companies undertake to achieve organizational legitimacy.  In 
addition to strategies used to alter interdependence and negotiate with the environment, 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) state that political actions and alliance are two important 
strategies for organizations to create an environment for their needs.  However, as to 
legitimation strategy, they believe that developing alliances with other organizations that 
possess a particular legitimacy is a less criticized but more effective strategy than the use 
of political means.  Their predictions about the alliance approach are confirmed by 
accounting and management research.  Fiedler and Deegan (2002) document that seeking 
legitimacy was one key incentive for the building and constructions industry to 
collaborate with the environmental groups in Australia.  In addition, Friedman and Miles 
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(2002) analyze the relationship between Greenpeace and environmental sensitive 
corporations over the decades.  They report the relationship has been transformed from 
incompatibility in actions in the 1970s to a partnership for environmental solutions in the 
recent years.  And the basic momentum of such evolution is from the process of 
compromising and alliance.  
Based on the renewal of resource dependence writings, it is clear that the 
perspective of resource dependence theory is narrowed to focus on critical powerful 
organizations.  This is in contrast to institutional theory that focuses on institutionalized 
organizations in general.  The level of specification of resource dependence theory is 
increased as the goal of interacting with the environment is precisely stated and the 
strategies are explicitly proposed.  The proactive organizational tactics prescribed by 
resource dependence theory indicate a link between this theory and research of 
organizational legitimation strategy. 
Legitimacy and Resource Flows 
 Several researchers (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Deegan, 2002; Suchman, 1995) 
agree with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, 2003) that legitimacy is simply like any resource 
that organizations must obtain from their environment.  In contrast, Hybels (1995) 
criticizes such assumption as presenting a tautological relationship between resource 
acquisition and legitimacy.   Hybels (1995) notes that legitimacy is said to be obtained as 
resources are transferred from others to the focal organization, yet legitimacy is required 
before external entities will confer any resource.  Legitimacy is a symbolic representation 
of the evaluation of an organization, which has no material form.  Thus, Hybel (1995) 
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emphasizes that legitimacy is better characterized as both part of the context for exchange 
and a by-product of exchange rather than viewing legitimacy as something ready for 
exchange among organizations.   
In addition, Hybels (1995) appealed to the asserted relation between resources and 
organizational legitimacy forwarded by Terreberry (1968) many years ago.  Terreberry 
(1968, p. 608) states “[t]he willingness of firm A to contribute to X and of agency B to 
refer personnel to X, and firm C to buy X’s product testifies to the legitimacy of X.”  
From this perspective, I agree that resource flow is a representation of legitimacy--an 
observable measure of an abstract concept-- and I also see the need to understand the 
roles played by several organizational constituencies whose interactions with the focal 
entity may inform us of the legitimate status of the firm.  Hybels (1995, p 243) states that 
“ to build a well-grounded theory of the legitimation of organizations, it is necessary 
above all to identify the critical actors, both internal and external, whose approval is 
necessary to the fulfillment of an organization’s functions”.  How is this concept similar 
or different from the notion of stakeholder theory?  Are these two concepts 
complementary to one another?  With these questions in mind, I examine the relationship 
between legitimacy and the different stakeholders who confer it. 
Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder Theory  
 Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) like the previously discussed theories is also 
concerned with the relation of organizations and their environment.  As the social 
expectation of business corporations changed, stockholders were no longer the only 
constituent group in a firm’s environment.  The term stakeholder first appeared in an 
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internal memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute in 1963, as a concept used to 
distinguish stockholders from any other group or individual who was also relevant to the 
survival of the firm (Freeman, 1984).  Freeman (1984) defines a stakeholder as any 
individual or group who can affect or is affected by the achievement of a firm’s 
objectives.  From a strategic management point of view, Freeman (1984) argues that in 
order to receive the necessary support for the continued survival of the firm, managers 
not only have to understand the needs and concerns of these stakeholder groups but also 
have to incorporate these needs and concerns into their strategic program.   
Not all stakeholder groups have direct influence on the operation of the firm.  
Thus stakeholders are separated into primary and secondary categories (Clarkson, 1995). 
The primary category includes shareholders, investors, employees, customers, suppliers, 
communities and governments whose continued participation is necessary to the survival 
of the firm.  The secondary stakeholder category includes groups or individuals who 
influence or are influenced by the corporation, but they are not engaged in transactions 
with the corporation and are not essential for its survival (e.g., special interest groups and 
the media).  Prior research sometimes questions the necessity of incorporating the needs 
and concerns of the secondary stakeholders into a firm’s managerial planning (Jensen, 
2002).  Freeman (1984) states that secondary stakeholders may be less relevant today, but 
if ignored, they could become a powerful group tomorrow and may have a direct effect 
on the firm’s operation.  For instance, Nestle suffered the consequences of a product 
boycott because the firm ignored the request from one of its secondary stakeholder 
groups, a social interest group, who wanted a total ban on improper marketing of infant 
formula in third-world countries (Sturdivant and Robinson, 1981). Therefore, an 
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organization must willingly undertake actions to negotiate with and to satisfy the 
expectations of as many stakeholders as possible.  Clearly, stakeholder theory does not 
embrace a passive approach for management. 
Modification in Perspective 
Legitimacy is conferred upon the organization by its observers, which is like 
beauty is in the eyes of the beholder.  Since legitimacy is judged subjectively by various 
stakeholders, the same organizational activity would not necessarily be judged equally by 
different stakeholder groups.  From this perspective, whether or not the objectives and 
actions of an organization are legitimate essentially depends upon the value systems of 
stakeholder groups rather than the value system of the larger society. 
While legitimacy theorists usually emphasize the importance of compliance with 
the expectations of society, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) explicitly recognizes that 
society is composed of different constituents (stakeholders) who have different and even 
conflicting expectations of firms.  While resource dependence theory concentrates on 
external organizations with power and resource, stakeholder theory acknowledges that 
stakeholder groups (both external and internal) have unequal power and ability to 
influence the actions of an organization (Mitchell et al., 1997).  Stakeholder theory 
explicitly recognizes the expectation differences among various groups and stresses the 
importance for organizations to meet the expectation of as many stakeholder groups as 
possible (Freeman, 1984). 
Gray et al. (1995) and Deegan (2002) both suggest that this change in analytical 
focus may be evidenced by Lindblom’s (1994) most cited legitimacy paper.  She 
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discusses the concerns of the “relevant publics” rather than the expectations of the 
“society”, which may indicate that proponents of legitimacy theory are shifting the focus 
from the value system of the larger society to the expectations of particular groups within 
society.  The scope of stakeholder theory has further narrowed to focus on how firms can 
strategically manage the demands of particularly powerful stakeholders (see Ullman, 
1985; Roberts, 1992; Neu et al., 1998). 
Although Freeman (1984) attempts to present stakeholder theory as a normative, 
strategic management practice for contemporary organizations, the stakeholder approach 
offers no concrete, unarguable prescriptions for what a corporation should stand for.  
According to Freeman (1984, p 210), the stakeholder approach “presents a framework for 
discussing a host of differing moral views”, and does not prescribe particular positions of 
moral worth to the actions of managers and the board.  From this perspective, 
stakeholders could confer different conceptions of legitimacy to an organization 
depending on the value system of the particular stakeholders. Suchman (1995) suggests 
three different legitimacy conceptions.  Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the self-interested 
calculations of the stakeholders who do the evaluation, which means some stakeholder 
groups may see particular organizational actions or policies as legitimate as long as these 
actions or policies are in their favor.  Moral legitimacy reflects a positive normative 
evaluation of the organization and its activities, in which stakeholders base their 
judgments on whether a given activity is “the right thing to do”, rather than whether the 
activity simply benefits them.  Cognitive legitimacy is based on cognition rather than on 
interest or evaluation.  Organizations are perceived to be cognitively legitimate if their 
structures and activities follow established pattern of other organizations that are 
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comprehensible and familiar to the stakeholder groups.  The three conceptions of 
legitimacy differ based on the value standards used by stakeholders to confer legitimacy. 
Communication and Compromise                   
Given this dynamic and complex nature of legitimacy, both Dowling and Pfeffer 
(1975) and Lindblom (1994) propose that if an organization perceives that its legitimacy 
is in question, the organization can attempt to change or manipulate the perceptions of 
those who confer legitimacy.  Because legitimacy is always subjectively judged and 
conferred by others (Suchman, 1995), legitimation strategies in concept should be based 
upon the organization’s understanding of stakeholder perception.  Freeman (1984, p166), 
however, states that most organizations tend to tell their side of the story without 
knowing what the stakeholders’ expectations are, and “this approach often simply incites 
a stakeholder group to action.”  Inaccurate assumptions in legitimation strategy may 
trigger a series of unexpected actions from stakeholder groups, which may eventually 
decrease legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). 
The concept of “stakeholder” is introduced as one way to revise the conceptual 
maps of managers11.  Within the current corporation structures, the key to successful 
interaction with stakeholders requires the willingness to communicate and compromise 
(Freeman, 1984).  If the results are to be meaningful, communication processes with 
stakeholders must be two-way, in which the positions of both sides are understood by one 
                                                 
11 Freeman (1984, p249) states that the main conceptual maps that the managers need to revise are the 
fiduciary to stakeholders and the notion of distributive justice, and emphasizes that “the sledding is rough, 





another.  Although proponents of legitimacy theory also emphasize the importance of 
communication (Suchman, 1995), they seem to be more interested in the strategic use of 
unilateral corporate communication such as environmental disclosures. 
Most importantly, Freeman (1984) stresses the willingness of compromise rather 
than the intention of manipulation.  The central idea of communication is 
“compromising”, which involves “giving up certain things to get other things” (Freeman, 
1984, p169).  The processes of communication provide managers the opportunities to 
explicitly recognize the possible overlapping interests between the company and key 
stakeholders.  Managers, therefore, have a clear understanding of what they need to give 
up to get stakeholder support or action on an issue.  Freeman (1984) states that from time 
to time, managers must take risks and commit themselves to positions that run counter to 
past company policy or even common practice.  The willingness to do this is the 
foundation to successful stakeholder management. 
Corporate managers engaging in stakeholder management via environmental 
disclosure seem not really inclined to social change.  For instance, based on 355 sets of 
projected/actual spending drawn from 10K reports, Patten (2005) reports that actual 
spending for pollution abatement and control equipment was lower than the projected 
amount for more than 75% of the observations.  This suggests that business corporations 
are manipulative rather than sincere in their environmental disclosure communication 
practice.  This process of attempted legitimation is more likely to reinforce the status quo 
of traditional practice.  On the other hand, the concept of compromise forwarded by 
stakeholder theory may provide organizations with a rationale for attending to their social 
acceptance and not only their economic profit. 
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The concept of compromise may explain why business corporations are 
voluntarily undertaking a number of social activities such as charitable contributions, 
employee matching gift programs, and community event sponsorship.  While the 
phenomenon of change in social expectations of business is a complicated one, not 
reducible to a single cause, I suggest the process of compromise may in turn provide the 
momentum for change in social expectation.  For instance, the initiation of certain 
community event sponsorships could be a compromise between a business entity and its 
community stakeholder group.  As this practice gains its social acceptance, it may 
become a legitimized norm for business entities that operate in the community and 
become a societal-level expectation. 
An Application of the Current Study  
Friedman (1962) and Bakan (2004) argue the only social responsibility of 
business organizations is to make profit.  From this perspective, researchers would argue 
that business organizations should only undertake social activities if such activities would 
enhance shareholder value.  Yet, corporations voluntarily undertake many social 
activities that may not necessary bring direct financial benefits to the firms (Hillman and 
Keim, 2001).  Corporate executives could have a variety of motivations for voluntarily 
undertaking certain socially desirable activities.  Nonetheless, within the domain of 
corporate social responsibility/ performance (CSP) research, a simplistic connection 
between social performance and economic benefit is usually implied (Griffin and Mahon, 
1997; Ullmann, 1985; Wood and Jones, 1995).  After decades of research, however, two 
critical questions remain unanswered.  
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First, is there a positive relationship between corporate social and financial 
performance?  If the answer is yes, then why are the results of more than three decades of 
research incompatible (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Margolis and Walsh, 2001)?  If the 
answer is no, then how do managers rationalize their decisions?  Second, why do the 
numbers of social activities undertaken by business organizations seem to be growing (or 
why are societal-level expectations for business’ social activities increasing)?  Limited by 
an economic focus and assumed stockholder primacy, Hillman and Keim (2001) admit 
that there is a gap in our understanding of the interactions between business corporations 
and society, especially, in the case of social issue participation.  
This paper now advances two propositions that provide partial answers for these 
questions.  I conclude that the continued existence of any social institution, including 
business entities, is conditioned by its societal legitimacy.  Business organizations are 
perceived to be legitimate when their actions are congruent with the expectations of those 
who confer the status of legitimacy.  Based on this theoretical argument, economic 
performance and efficiency appear to be necessary but not sufficient to ensure firm 
survival and growth.   
Prior research on corporate social and financial performance evidently has 
overlooked the fact that not all firms start a similar social activity at the same time.  Why 
do some firms choose to initiate social programs and others are just simply following the 
trend?  This is an important variable because the primary motivation of firms to initiate or 
adopt a particular social activity may be reflected in the timing of such undertaking.  
Thus, the relationship between corporate social performance and economic benefit may 
be dependent upon the timing to undertake a particular social activity among different 
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firms. For instance, as a socially desirable activity spreads, a threshold is reached beyond 
which adoption provides legitimacy rather than improves financial performance 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  This economic benefit is 
diminished when other organizations in the field start to mimic the actions of these 
leaders.  Consequently, these activities began to gain social acceptance and eventually 
become a common expectation of doing business in the field.  Hence: 
   
PROPOSITION 1.  Legitimacy is the sole reward when social activities 
undertaken by business corporations merely meet well-established social 
expectations. 
  
It is possible for some managers to rationalize certain business social activity 
because those activities are consistent with the role and legitimacy of business 
organizations (Margolis and Walsh, 2001).  In most capitalist societies, this view is 
unlikely to be the dominant belief because financial responsibilities are of fundamental 
concern of most business institutions (Carroll, 1979).  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue 
that early initiators of innovative social activities are commonly driven by a desire to 
improve economic performance.  Examples of this practice include the Apple Computer 
educational technology grants for schools, or the American Express credit card donation 
project for the Statue of Liberty.  When the social performance of business entities is 
above and beyond expectation of their targeted stakeholders, the relevant stakeholders are 
theorized to usually reward such actions.  Typically this benefit is engaged by early 




PROPOSITION 2.  There is a short-term economic benefit available when social 
activities initiated by business corporations exceed the expectations of their 
targeted stakeholders. 
 
  In sum, some business entities initiate social activities for economic benefit, and 
others may undertake such activities to manage their societal legitimacy. As this situation 
is continually repeated, momentum spirals to broaden the social expectation of business 
corporations.     
Discussion and Closing Remarks 
 The purpose of this paper was to investigate the overlapping perspectives of 
legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder 
theory and to integrate these theories into a more cohesive meta-theory of the 
organization-society interface.  Several scholars recognize these theories share some 
common characteristics, yet how they are really related is unclear.  This current study 
presents the relationships among the theories explicitly (figure 1-1).  Legitimacy theory 
states that legitimacy is a status or condition that is achieved when the value system of an 
organization is congruent with the value system of the larger society.  Organizations seek 
this status through the process of legitimation.  This broad societal-level view, however, 
is primarily based on abstract concepts and reason.  As a result, it does not offer any 
solution on how the congruency could be practically obtained or empirically examined.  
Depending on the purpose of legitimation, there are primarily two levels of legitimacy---
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institutional legitimacy and organizational (or strategic) legitimacy.  The process of 
seeking institutional legitimacy is directly related to institutional theory.   The concepts of 
resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory are more relevant to the process of 
strategic legitimacy. 
 Institutional theory proposes that the institutionalized value patterns of a social 
system are integrated into the concrete behaviors of its institutions.  The scope is limited 
to the patterns of established institutions as the symbolic representation of the social 
value system.  Institutional theorists believe that conformity to long-established 
institutional norms is the path to institutional legitimacy.  This process of legitimation in 
turn also reinforces the legitimacy of the social value system.  As Proposition 1 suggests, 
societal legitimacy is the reward when activities undertaken by organizations are merely 
in conformity to institutionalized social expectations. 
Instead of focusing on the social value system or institutionalized social patterns, 
resource dependence theory adopts a more narrow perspective.  The theory focuses on 
how organizations collaborate with other powerful external organizations that control 
vital resources required for continued existence.  Most importantly, I agree with Hybels 
(1995) that resource flows are an observable representation of the abstract concept of 
legitimacy.  From this point of view, legitimacy and resources are much the same. 
Finally, stakeholder theory recognizes that legitimacy is subjectively evaluated 
according to the value standards of stakeholder groups, rather than the value system of 
the larger society.  Freeman (1984) emphasizes that the willingness to communicate and 
compromise is the required solution to stakeholders’ approval and support.  As suggested 
by Proposition 2, organizations may receive a short-term economic return if the 
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performance of their initiated activities is beyond the current expectations of their 
stakeholders.  When other organizations begin to imitate these leaders, soon a threshold is 
reached.  As a result, implementation of such imitative activities confers legitimacy rather 
than economic returns.   This course of action, in part, gives force to the changes of social 
expectation (legitimacy). 
The analysis shows that although these theories are different in their levels of 
perspective, and levels of specificity and resolution, they are much the same.  They have 
a common goal--to explain how organizations ensure survival.  Most importantly, they 
realize that financial performance and efficiency may be necessary but not sufficient for 
organizations to reach this objective.  This commensurability provides a strong 
theoretical foundation to sustain and advance social and environmental accounting 
research, because firms’ participation in social activities is indispensable for them to 
maintain their societal legitimacy.    
 These theories are important to the field of accounting and organizational research, 
and this analysis reveals that it is more meaningful to consider them as components of a 
greater whole rather than to treat them as totally unrelated concepts.    This meta-theory is 
capable of making compatible interpretations of organization-society relationships and 
issues from various perspectives because it embraces different levels of perspectives and 
resolution.   The integration of these theories provides us with a better understanding of 
each individual theory and a broader view of the organization-society interface.   
This integrated perspective presented in this paper, however, is somewhat 
simplistic and not uncontestable.  In order to reduce the complexity, I have tried to limit 
my focus to the original notions of these theories.  This choice unavoidably has omitted 
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many profound insights regarding the implication of these theoretical concepts.  
Nevertheless, this paper is the first study to demonstrate the possibility of incorporating 
several theories into a meta-theory, and reveals the usefulness of investigating a 
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     Legitimacy Theory 
Scope of perspective:  Social value system 
 
Focal point:   If the values system of an organization is  
    congruent with the value system of society 
 
Rationale of actions:  To meet social expectations or to gain   
    social acceptance  
 
Figure 1-1 Relationships among Theories
Institutional legitimacy Strategic legitimacy 
Institutional Theory 




Focal point:  
How to conform to the 
established patterns of 
other similar social 
institutions 
 
Rationale of actions: 
To gain legitimacy, and 
to attract resources  
Resource Dep. Theory 
 
Scope of perspective: 
External organizations  
   
Focal point: 
How an organization can  
gain access to relevant 
resources  
    
 
Rationale of actions: 
To obtain vital resource 
for survival and growth  
Stakeholder Theory 
 
Scope of perspective: 
Internal and external 
stakeholder groups 
  
Focal point:  
How a firm can balance 
the conflicting demands 
of various stakeholders 
 
Rationale of actions: 
To obtain approval from 
powerful stakeholders 
Proposition 1 










CORPORATE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS: 
A COROPRATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE OR LEGITIMATION STRATEGY? 
 
Introduction  
The relationship between businesses and society has been a subject of much 
discussion.  The general public does not only require business entities to undertake their 
economic function legally and ethically but also expects corporations to voluntarily share 
some of their resources with the society in which they operate (Carroll, 1979; 1991; 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), 2005).  In addition to 
large firms, shareholder activists tend to target firms that have poor employee practices, 
product safety issues and environmental concerns when demanding changes in corporate 
practices (Rehbein, Waddock and Graves, 2004).  Because firms have limited resources, 
how corporate executives rationalize their philanthropic behavior and their other 
business-related social performance activities is under constant examination.  Moreover, 
whether or not corporations should be required to disclose their social activities such as 
charitable contributions in their financial statements is an ongoing debate (e, g. Gray et 
al., 1997; Elkington, 1999; Gillmor and Bremer, 1999) among many stakeholder groups.  
Prior management research in the domain of corporate social 
responsibility/performance positions corporate charitable contributions at the top of the 
pyramid of corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 1979; 1991) and as a primary 




According to Carroll’s (1979) scheme of corporate social responsibility, discretionary 
responsibility such as corporate philanthropy is subject to a last in first out (LIFO) 
method of placement on a firm’s action inventory (Wood, 1991).  Thus, business entities 
first fulfill their economic, legal and ethical responsibilities and then attend to their 
philanthropic affairs.  In accordance with Carroll’s (1979) conceptual framework, 
corporate charitable contribution and firm-specific problems such as employee relations, 
product safety and environmental performance are expected to be negatively related.  It is 
because the more resources a firm has to spend to improve their employee relations, 
product safety and environmental performance, the less resources the firm has left over 
for philanthropy.  If this view of corporate strategy is correct, then corporate charitable 
contributions would be a reasonable indicator of corporate social performance. 
On the other hand, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Dowling and Pfeffer, (1975) and 
others, have argued that charitable contributions are a form of legitimating behavior, and 
that the amount of contributions would be expected to vary over contexts or over time to 
the extent that legitimacy is more or less problematic.  This argument is consistent with 
environmental disclosure research results documenting that firms who have a poorer 
environmental performance records tend to make more extensive mitigating 
environmental disclosures (Patten, 2002).  Based on this legitimation assumption, 
corporate charitable contributions and firm-specific problems with employee relations, 
environmental performance and product safety are expected to be positively related. 
If the legitimation perspective is correct, then the perceived merit of corporate 




resources may be perceived as socially responsible firms, yet in fact they may be culpable 
when their other socially related business practices such as reduction in workforce, and 
negative environmental impact are concurrently examined.  Most importantly, this 
legitimation practice can lead to unjustified resource allocation and hinder social progress 
(Puxty, 1991) because currently corporations are rewarded, via tax deduction and other 
recognition, for their donations regardless of their other business-related social 
performance.  As a result, the public loses the tax revenue that would be received if not 
for the deductibility of corporate charitable contributions.  Moreover, the public 
eventually must cope with certain costs that are transferred by detrimental business 
practices, such as harmful environmental impact of production and unsafe products, to 
society.  Societal resources may be wrongfully rewarded to corporations that in reality 
should be penalized if their other actions are also accounted for.    
The purpose of this study is to explore whether corporate charitable contributions 
are representations of corporate social performance as theorized by Carroll (1979; 1991) 
and Wood (1991) or corporate legitimation actions as theorized by Dowling and Pfeffer, 
(1975).  To date, no published study has directly examined the relations between 
charitable contributions and business-related social issues, nor has a published study 
simultaneously investigated these phenomena from different conceptual viewpoints.  This 
study extends existing research by examining these relations through the juxtaposition of 
two different theoretical perspectives and by using the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini 
(KLD) corporate social performance ratings to empirically test predictions derived from 




                                                
Furthermore, the results of this current study are relevant to the ongoing efforts to 
extend business reporting and accounting into a wider context (e, g. Gray et al., 1997; 
Elkington, 1999; Gillmor and Bremer, 1999).  From a shareholder perspective, the U. S. 
Congress proposed an amendment that requires public corporations to disclose 
information regarding their charitable contributions (Gillmor and Bremer, 1999).  The 
proposed legislation states that shareholder access to corporate information is essential 
for the proper functioning of U. S. securities markets1.  This proposed legislation focuses 
primarily on the ownership of corporations.  Should shareholders be the only group who 
are entitled to corporate information?  From a broader perspective, Gray et al., (1997) and 
others advocate for social accounting2 that emphasizes the rights for various stakeholders.  
These researchers argue that all stakeholders have the right to information, and 
organizations have the duty to provide an account of their actions.  They are not 
concerned with whether stakeholders use the information or how stakeholders use it.  
Gray et al., (1997) describe social accounting as the presentation of information about 
organizational activities to parties other than directors and controllers of the reporting 
organization.  Although corporate reporting is traditionally financial in nature, the 
increased use and application of the term “triple bottom line” (Elkington, 1999) in the 
business world indicates that financial reporting alone is insufficient to meet the needs of 
various stakeholders.  Currently, some corporations voluntarily apply the triple bottom 
 
1 This proposed legislation is still in the U. S. Congress, and the preliminary response from the Securities 
and Exchange Commission regarding this proposal is that the amount of charitable contributions is not 
material. 
2 A wide variety of terms have been employed in social accounting such as social audit, social 





line approach to report their financial, social and environmental performances and link 
their practices to the idea of sustainable development.   
The findings of this study can provide insights into the usefulness of the various 
reporting proposals.  If charitable contributions are representations of corporate social 
performance, charitable contribution disclosure within financial statements, as proposed 
by the Congress, can be the first step to stakeholder rights for information.  In contrast, if 
charitable contributions are legitimation tactics used by corporations, requirements for 
corporations to report their financial, social, and environmental performances 
simultaneously in one statement seem more appropriate.  
Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development 
Carroll’s (1979) conceptual model of corporate social performance, and Dowling 
and Pfeffer’s (1975) framework of organizational legitimation appear to be instructive in 
explaining organization -society interactions.  Yet, I argue that these two conceptual 
schemes postulate competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between corporate 
charitable contributions and business-related issues such as the management of employee 
relations, product safety and environmental performance. The conceptions of these two 
frameworks and their corresponding hypotheses are articulated below. 
Corporate Social Performance 
Carroll’s (1979) conceptual model of corporate social performance has set a 




Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991; Swanson, 1995).  According to Carroll (1979), corporate 
social performance involves three components: (1) the identification of the domains of an 
organization’s social responsibility; (2) the development of processes to evaluate 
stakeholder demands; and (3) the implementation of programs to manage social issues.  
The first component, business social responsibility identification, is necessary because 
different responsibilities may be evaluated by different stakeholder groups in different 
ways and trigger dissimilar management actions. For instance, shareholders may be most 
interested in the financial returns of their investment.  In order to meet their shareholders’ 
expectation, corporate managers may choose to reduce their direct labor cost by 
outsourcing part or all of their assembling work overseas.  Intentional layoffs of domestic 
laborers, on the other hand, may not be considered an ethical management practice for 
other stakeholder groups, especially for employees and their families.  Thus if corporate 
managers are not only concerned with their financial responsibilities, outsourcing may 
not be the best choice.  Carroll (1979) divides business social responsibility into four 
categories: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities.  
Economic responsibilities.  The first and foremost social responsibility of 
business is economic in nature, which is to produce goods and services that society wants 
and needs, and any other legally sanctioned actions required to carry out these functions. 
Unless the business fulfills its economic functions, then it will neither have the resources 
to perform other roles nor will it survive long enough to be an agent for any form of 
societal change.  A similar notion has also been forwarded by Bakan (2004) and 




Legal responsibilities.  Society grants business institutions the right to reach their 
economic goals and explicitly requires businesses to fulfill these goals within the 
framework of legal requirements.  However, the line between economic and legal 
responsibilities of business cannot be easily drawn.  For instance, product safety and the 
ramifications of production processes on the health of employees would each be 
considered matters of economic and legal responsibilities.     
 Ethical responsibilities.  Though less well defined, society has expectations of 
businesses over and above legal requirements.  Ethical responsibilities call for business 
corporations to make their policies and practices consistent with societal values in such 
matters as fair employment practices and a harmless environmental impact of production.  
Workforce reduction, for instance, is a legally acceptable business practice yet it could be 
ethically controversial (Cascio et al., 1997).   
Discretionary responsibilities.   In Carroll’s framework, discretionary 
responsibilities are socially desirable actions taken by business entities that are beyond 
their economic, legal and ethical obligations.   The public anticipates business 
corporations to voluntarily contribute their financial and human resources to the general 
improvement of society.  Activities such as philanthropy and community leadership are 
examples of discretionary responsibility.  Because Carroll (1979) defines these activities 
as discretionary, businesses may choose, or have discretion over the type, timing, and 





Carroll (1979) emphasizes that any given business action could have economic, 
legal, ethical, or discretionary motives embodied in it, but actions can be categorized as 
primarily having one of these four motivations.  Although all of these business 
responsibilities may be simultaneously expected, business history reports that companies 
placed an initial emphasis on the economic, then added legal responsibilities, and later 
showed a concern for their ethical and discretionary responsibilities (Carroll, 1979).  
Corporate executives are subject to multiple and even competing demands from various 
stakeholders (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999).  Several studies investigate how 
managers prioritize their limited resources to fulfill the economic, legal, ethical, and 
discretionary expectations placed on their organizations.  Aupperle et al, (1985) surveyed 
241 corporate executives to test the relative values or weights of each of the four 
components of Carroll’s (1979) framework.  The relative degrees of importance the 
executives place on each component were: economic = 3.5, legal = 2.54, ethical =2.22 
and discretionary = 1.30.  The empirical results also suggest that the more concerned a 
firm is with its economic responsibilities, the less interest it has in its ethical and 
discretionary responsibilities.  A similar prioritization result was also reached by Ruf et 
al., (1993) when they applied an analytic hierarchy process to determine the relative 
importance of corporate social performance.  Thus, among these four types of 
responsibilities, discretionary responsibilities are weighted as being least important.  This 
consistent finding led Wood (199, p. 698) to argue that discretionary responsibilities such 




on a firm’s action inventory.” 
  More recent empirical work (Rehbein, Waddock and Graves, 2004) reports that 
in addition to large firms, companies that have problems over employee relations, product 
safety issues and environmental performance are more likely to be targeted for operation 
improvement by shareholder activists.  According to Carroll’s (1979) scheme, favorable 
employee relations are important for a business to perform its economic functions.  In 
order to fulfill its economic responsibilities and to reduce the risk of activists’ criticism, 
firms that have employee relationship problems are theorized to devote more of their 
resources in employee relationship improvement, and therefore have fewer funds 
available from which to make charitable contributions.  Thus, the following hypothesis is 
offered. 
 
H1a: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and  
firm-specific problems with employee relations are negatively related.   
 
Tinker and Niemark (1987, p.84) state that “the public, in general, became 
increasingly aware of the adverse consequences of corporate growth”.  The society’s 
concerns of the negative environmental impacts of business production and development 
are evidenced by the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency and other 
environmental related policies and regulations.  Some specific examples are the 
implementations of the Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (the “Superfund”) and 




environmental regulations is a legal responsibility.  Currently, the U. S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations and accounting standards require publicly 
traded corporations to disclose environmental related information in their financial 
statements and 10K reports (Berthelot et al., 2003).  In addition, the results of a national 
survey of shareholders who own at least 100 shares of one stock on either the New York 
or American Stock Exchange indicate that shareholders prefer companies to spend money 
on environmental pollution prevention rather than to give to charities (Epstein, 1993). 
This result is consistent with Carroll’s (1979) responsibility scheme; corporate executives 
consider fulfillment of their legal responsibility is more important than charitable giving.  
The discussion leads to the following hypothesis.  
 
       H1b: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and  
firm-specific problems with environmental issues are 
  negatively related. 
 
As previously noted, any given business action may result from several business 
motives.  Product safety, for example, is an ethical as well as a legal responsibility under 
current regulations.  Businesses are expected to manufacture safe products, and under the 
requirements of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Food & Drug 
Administration (FDA), the National Highway & Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA), 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), product safety is also a legal 




out their economic functions.  Epstein (1993) reports that product quality and safety are 
perceived by shareholders as the top business responsibility (91%) over environmental 
protection (85%) and charitable contributions (36%). In accordance with Carroll’s (1979) 
framework, business managers should first allocate their resources to improve the safety 
and quality of their products because this choice meets their economic, legal, and ethical 
obligations. Then they may consider their philanthropy expectations such as charitable 
donations. Thus, the following hypothesis is postulated. 
 
H1c: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and  
firm-specific problems with product safety are negatively related. 
 
Legitimacy and Legitimation 
An alternative view of charitable contributions is from the perspective of 
legitimacy theory.  Study One of this dissertation, examining the commensurability of 
legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory and stakeholder 
theory, concludes that although these theories are different in their levels of perspective, 
specificity and resolution, they share one common goal --to explain how organizations 
survive and endure in a changing society.  And most importantly, these theories realize 
that financial performance and efficiency may be necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for organizations to reach of objective of survival. The continued existence and 




societal legitimacy.  Organizations are perceived to be legitimate when their goals, 
methods of operation and outcomes are congruent with the expectations of those who 
confer legitimacy (Lindbolm 1994). 
Firms are expanding efforts to manage their legitimacy because it “helps to ensure 
the continued inflow of capital, labor and customers necessary for viability… it also 
forestalls regulatory activities by the state that might occur in the absence of legitimacy… 
and pre-empts product boycotts or other disruptive actions by external parties…” (Neu et 
al., 1998, p.265).  How organizations manage their legitimacy has been and still is, an 
interest of academic inquiries (e. g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Lindbolm 1994 and Suchman, 1995), and many 
inquiries have applied or extended the legitimation strategies forwarded by Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975).   
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) state that organizations have three basic methods 
available to manage their legitimacy: (1) the organizations can modify their goals, 
methods of operation, and performance in conformity with the prevailing definitions of 
legitimacy, (2) the organizations can attempt to alter the definitions of social legitimacy 
to the extent that social expectation is congruent with the current practices of the 
organization, and (3) the organizations can make an effort to identify or associate 
themselves with symbols, values, or institutions that have a strong perceived image of 
social legitimacy.  The implementation of a conformity strategy is relevant to 
institutionalization and as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) note, this process of legitimation 




Conversely, instead of actually changing the ways organizations are conducted, 
the organization might choose the strategy of ceremonial conformity (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977).  Organizations might adopt certain highly visible and relevant practices that are 
consistent with social expectations while leaving the essential operations of the 
organization intact.  This legitimation strategy is enacted only for its symbolic quality. 
From the management perspective, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) are concerned with the 
effect of legitimation and argue organizations run the risk of “protesting too much” if 
legitimation actions are taken only based on organizations’ self evaluation of their 
legitimacy status. The differences between corporate manager’s understanding of their 
legitimacy status and the expectations of those who confer the status are called 
“legitimacy gaps” (Sethi, 1979).   
Wartick and Mahon (1994) suggest that legitimacy gaps may arise for several 
reasons.  First, corporate performance changes while societal expectations of corporate 
performance remain the same, or societal expectations of corporate performances change 
while corporate performance remains the same.  In this situation, what was once 
acceptable corporate practice becomes problematic.  Second, both corporate performance 
and societal expectations may change, but they either move in different directions, or 
they move in the same direction but with a time lag.  In addition, empirical evidence also 
shows the reputation or legitimacy of the organization, or the industry would be 
threatened if particular external or internal adverse social or environmental events 




Lindblom (1994) applied Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) legitimation strategies to 
investigate the function of corporate social and environmental disclosure.  She suggests 
that in addition to actual change in organizational practices, change in the perceptions and 
expectations of those who confer legitimacy, firms can also manipulate perception by 
deflecting attention from the issue of concern to other related issues of strength.  For 
instance, corporations may emphasize their philanthropic actions (Williams, and Barrett, 
2000) and pollution control initiatives (Patten, 2005) in their reports and downplay their 
records of workforce reduction or EPA violations. 
 Prior work in accounting research demonstrates that firms tend to use social and 
environmental disclosures as a strategic tool to manage their relevant stakeholders 
(Ullmann, 1985; Roberts, 1992; Neu et al., 1998) and symbolically repair their legitimacy 
(Patten, 2005).  There are several concerns associated with such a practice.  First, 
environmental disclosure information not only lacks value, it can be purposely 
misleading (Deegan, 2002; Patten, 2005).  Second, managers may provide corporate 
social responsibility information as a method to manipulate their stakeholders, not to 
meet societal expectation for accountability.  This manipulative practice could lead to 
unjustified resource allocations and eventually jeopardize social progress (Puxty, 1991) 
because the public may wrongfully reward resources to organizations that indeed should 




Corporate charitable contributions and legitimation    
Social and environmental disclosure, however, is only one of many potential tools 
that firms can use to manage their legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002).  Corporate charitable 
contributions have been theorized as an important legitimation strategy used by 
corporations.  Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Dowling and Pfeffer, (1975) and others, state 
that charitable contributions are a form of legitimating behavior, and the amount of 
contributions would be expected to vary over contexts or over time to the extent that 
legitimacy is more or less problematic.  This theorization is consistent with 
environmental disclosure research findings; firms that have a poor environmental 
performance record tend to disclose more than their better performing counterparts(Patten, 
2002).  If corporate charitable contributions and environmental disclosure are both 
legitimation strategies, firms that have problems with their social and environmental 
practices are theorized to use their charitable contributions as an attention deflecting tool 
to redirect concern away from the issues (Lindblom, 1994), and attempt to minimize the 
negative effect on their legitimacy.  Thus, in contrast with the corporate social 
responsibilities perspective (Carroll, 1979; 1991), if business entities using charitable 
contributions to manage their legitimacy status, their contributions could be increased 
when their legitimacy is in question.  Firm legitimacy becomes problematic when firms 
have poor employee relations, environmental troubles and product safety issues (Rhebein, 




Hypotheses   
Employee relations.  Employees are vitally important primary stakeholders.  
Research findings indicate that firms that have good relationship with their employees are 
rewarded with higher productivity and better financial performance (e. g. Becker and 
Gerhart, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Huselid et al., 1997; O’Reilly and Pfeffer, 2000).  
Managers are believed to be generally cautious in their employee practices.  However, 
management decisions such as layoffs and the underfunding of employee pension plans 
may not only jeopardize employee relations but also turn business choices into significant 
social issues. Cascio et al.(1997) and Palliam and Shalhoub (2002) document that the 
expected positive economic results of downsizing are often elusive.  Moreover, the public 
expects corporations not only to be responsible to stockholders, but also to employees 
and the society in which they are a part (WBCSD, 2005).  Layoffs and underfunding 
employees’ pensions penalize society by shifting the economic burden from business 
entities to the public, and as a result, corporate legitimacy is threatened.  In addition, 
Zyglidopoulos (2004) reports that corporate legitimacy is especially questioned when 
firms are financially sound prior to downsizing.  These types of management decisions 
attract public attention, for instance, the case of AT&T was discussed on the Public 
Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) Newshour (PBS, 1996).  According to Lindblom’s (1994) 
attention deflecting strategy then, firms that have poor employee relations would be more 
likely to make charitable donations than firms that have better employee relations.  Thus, 





H2a: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and  
firm-specific problems with employee relations are positively related.  
 
Environmental concerns.  Prior accounting research provides evidence that 
legitimation is one primary motivation for firms’ environmental disclosures (e.g. Deegan 
et al., 1996; Patten, 1992, 2002; Neu et al., 1998).  Patten (2002) documents that 
corporations which have poor environmental performance tend to make more extensive 
mitigating environmental disclosures than their better performing counterparts.  In 
addition to using environmental reporting as a legitimation instrument, corporations can 
also use their charitable contributions as a complementary means to repair their 
legitimacy.  Williams and Barrett (2000), for instance, examine the influence of corporate 
charitable giving programs on the link between the number of EPA and OSHA violations 
committed by a firm and its public image.  The results indicate that although a firm’s 
public image can be diminished through its violation of environmental and labor 
regulations, the extent of the decline in public image is reduced through charitable giving.  
Charitable contributions appear to offer corporations a partial remedy for repairing their 
legitimacy.  Thus, the following hypothesis is offered. 
 
H2b: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and  





Product safety.  Thousands of products are manufactured and used by consumers 
every year.  The public in general expects and relies on business corporations to 
manufacture, import, and transfer safe products.  However, each year many products such 
as furniture, appliances, children’s products, drugs and even foods are recalled, 
withdrawn or regarded unsafe.  Product safety is not only a business concern but also a 
societal issue.  Unsafe or faulty products can create danger and cause injuries. For 
instance, the CPSC (2005) reports that more than two hundred thousand (206,500) toy-
related injuries were treated in U. S. hospital emergency rooms in 2003.  The government 
agencies such as CPSC and FDA publicize the recall of a harmful or defective product on 
their websites when they believe the public needs to be alerted about a serious hazard.  
The publicity of such events damages corporate legitimacy.  In addition to removing 
unsafe products from the market, to compensate harmed individuals, corporations are 
theorized to use their charitable contributions as a means to partially mitigate their 
legitimacy loss. 
    
H2c: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and  
firm-specific problems with product safety are positively related. 
Method and Research Design 
 
 I test the hypotheses by developing an empirical model of corporate charitable 




corporate charitable contribution.  The data sources and analyses used to test each 
hypothesis are discussed below. 
 The overall empirical form of the model is stated as: 
 
 ChaContit = a1 + b1(EmpRelit) + b2(Envit) + b3(ProSafit) + b4(IndClait ) + 
   b5(Sizeit ) + b6(Profit ) + b7(AdvExpit ) + b8(Ageit )  
 
where 
 ChaContit = the charitable contributions by firm i in period t, 
 EmpRelit = the KLD employee relations concern score for firm i in period t, 
 Envit  = the KLD environmental concern score for firm i in period t, 
ProSafit = the KLD product safety concern score for firm i in period t, 
IndClait = the industry classification for firm i in period t, 
Sizeit  = the total assets for firm i in period t, 
 Profit  = the net income for firm i in period t, 
 AdvExpit = the advertisement expenses by firm i in period t, 
 Ageit  = the age of firm i at period t.  
 
 The function of the charitable contribution model will be tested using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression with group dummy variables.  The results of Hausman 
tests will determine the best model for the data set.  If the empirical results of test 




                                                
of corporate social performance is supported.  On the other hand, if the results of test 
variables are significant but with positive sign, then Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975)’s 
legitimation proposition is confirmed.  
Dependent variable 
 Charitable contributions.  Each firm’s total amount of charitable contributions 
during 1998-2000 were obtained from the Corporate Giving Directory (2003), the 
Directory of Corporate and Foundation Givers (2000) and Tax Returns of private 
foundations (990-PF).  Both cash gifts (including direct giving and donation to corporate 
sponsored foundations) and gifts in-kind (if applicable) were added during the period.  
The resulting figures (in millions) are used as the dependent variable in the current study. 
Test variables 
 Corporate social performance variables are obtained from the social research firm 
Kinder, Lydengerg, Domini’s (KLD) Socrates database3.  Although several other 
corporate social performance reports are available, the numbers of companies or the 
dimensions of corporate social performance covered by these reports are limited.  On the 
other hand, KLD data offer several desirable qualities.  KLD has quantifiable social 
records of over 3,000 publicly traded U.S. companies across a range of dimensions 
 
3 Socrates is a proprietary database program issued by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & CO. Inc. that provides 





pertaining to business related social concerns.  Moreover, KLD’s data have been used 
extensively in a growing body of largely management-based U.S. research on corporate 
social performance issues (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997a, 1997b; Griffin and Mahon, 
1997; Agle et al., 1999; Berman et al., 1999; Greening and Turban, 2000; Hillman and 
Keim, 2001; Ruf et al., 2001; Waddock, 2003; Rehbein et al., 2004), and recently have 
also been applied in accounting research (e.g. Cho, Patten and Roberts, 2005).  Most 
importantly, these data have been validated as the best currently available measurements 
of corporate social performance (Sharfman, 1996; Szwajkowski and Figlewicz, 1999).  A 
complete and detailed description of the KLD rating system is available from Waddock 
and Graves (1997a, 1997b) and KLD’s website (www.kld.com). 
    The test variables used in the current study are KLD’s corporate performance 
rating for the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P) largest companies and another 150 publicly 
traded companies that are also included in the index.  KLD separately assigns strengths 
and concerns across eight social performance dimensions.  These dimensions are 
community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human 
rights, product, and others (KLD, 2003). Among these different dimensions, three 
measurements (employee relations, environment, and product safety) are relevant to and 
thus selected for the current study. 
 Employee relations.  KLD analyzes corporate employee relations’ strengths and 
concerns based on an extensive evaluation of each company’s union relations, labor 
policy, employee benefit, employee involvement, and compliance with labor related 




of union relations; (2) have cash profit distributions or stock options available to the 
majority of their employees; and (3) have a strong retirement benefit program.  On the 
other hand, high concern ratings are given to firms that (1) have a poor history of union 
relations; (2) have records of employee health and safety standards violations; (3) have 
reduced their workforce by 15% in the most recent year or by 25% during the past two 
years or have announcement of such reduction; and (4) have either underfunded pension 
or inadequate retirement benefits. 
 Environment performance.  KLD assesses corporate environmental performance 
strengths and concerns based on the following criteria.  Firms are given high strength 
ratings when they have excellent environmental planning, environmental impact 
minimizing procedures, or they take initiative to use environmentally-friendly natural 
resources.  In contrast, high concern ratings are assigned to companies that have poor 
environmental law and regulations compliance records, a significant portion of their 
revenues generated from products or services that have negative environmental 
consequences, or have failed to keep up with industry-wide environmental preventive 
standards. 
Product safety.  Firms are given product strength ratings when they have national 
recognized quality programs or have provided products or services for the economically 
disadvantaged, or they are industry leaders for research and development.  Conversely, 
companies are assigned high product concern ratings when they have recently been 
involved in controversies or regulatory actions pertaining to the safety of their products 




fraud, or antitrust.   
 KLD assigns a score of zero, one, or two for each of the strength and concern 
areas.  Because this study focuses on how corporate executives rationalize their 
philanthropic behavior while the firms have problems with employee relationships, 
product safety and environmental performance; the sum of each concern rating for the 
above three areas are used as the measurements for the independent variables.  This is 
consistent with the study of Cho et al. (2005), as they investigate the relationship between 
the extent of firms’ environmental concerns and the amount of their political 
expenditures. 
Control variables 
 Findings of prior studies in corporate social performance and charitable 
contributions have found significant relationships between industry classification, 
company size, profitability, advertisement expense, the age of a company and corporate 
donations.  Accordingly, these variables should be controlled for in empirical tests.  All 










Table 2-1 Descriptions of Variables 
Variable name  
(expected sign) 
Description Data source 
Dependent variable    
ChaCont (n a.) Charitable contributions of firm 
1998-2000 
Corporate Giving Directory, 
Directory of Corporate and 
Foundation givers, and 
Returns of Private 
Foundation (990-PF) 
Test variables   
Employee relations 
EmpRel (+/-) 
Evaluation of employee relations 




Env (+/-)  
Evaluation of environmental 




Evaluation of product safety 
concern scores 1998-2000 
KLD 
Control variables   
Industry classification 
IndCla (+) 
IndCla =1 if firms in industries 
that rely more on consumer sales, 
public perceptions or are labor 















Advertising and promotion 
expense of firm 1998-2000 
Compustat 
Age(+) Age of firm in 2000 Mergent online 
 
 
Industry classification.  Prior studies have found some systematic relations 
between broad industry characteristics and corporate social responsibility activities and 
contributions.  Industry differences have been shown to be significantly related to a 
company’s social responsibility practices.  Roberts (1992) documents that firms in the 




have higher levels of social responsibility disclosures.  For this current study, 
environmentally sensitive firms are more likely to have environmental issues than 
service-oriented companies.  Product safety concerns are more relevant to manufacturing 
corporations than to merchandising or servicing firms.  For charitable contributions, firms 
in industries that rely more on consumer sales (Burt, 1983), public perceptions (Clotfelter, 
1985), or are more labor intensive (Navarro, 1988) tend to donate more.  Based on 
Standard Industrial classification (SIC) code and numbers of employees, if a sample 
firms is identified with one of the above three industries, the variable IndCla is set equal 
to one; else IndCla is set equal to zero.  
 Company size.  Company size has been shown to correlate with charitable 
contributions (McElroy, and Siegfried, 1985). Firm size creates social and political 
exposures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Miles, 1987), and as a result, larger firms have 
a higher level of visibility to the general public and the government as well as to grant-
seeking organizations.  In addition, larger firms are also more likely to institutionalize 
their charitable giving programs via corporate sponsored foundations (Webb, 1992; 
Werbel and Carter, 2002).  In this study, the natural log of assets is used as a control 
variable for firm size. 
  Profitability.  Profitability might also create social and political exposures.  In 
addition, charitable giving is related to profits because firms time their donations as a 
means to reduce their taxable income (Webb, 1994).  Another reason why donations are 
tied to profitability is because many firms used a fixed percentage of pretax net income to 




used to control for the potential effect of profitability on the amount of charitable 
contributions. 
 Advertising expense.  Research has also found significant positive correlations 
between advertising expense and charitable contributions (Fry et al., 1982; Navarro, 
1988).  These studies posited that contributions and advertisements are both vehicles used 
by corporations to negotiate favorable corporate images with different audiences. To 
control for the effect, the amount of advertising and promotion expenses (in millions) for 
each year is included. 
   The age of a company.  Consistent with Roberts (1992), the maturity of a firm 
may affect its social responsibility activities because as a firm matures, its reputation and 
history of involvement with nonprofit and charitable organizations can become 
entrenched. For instance, the Ford Motor Foundation has a history of supporting 
museums and arts.  Mature corporations are more likely to have long-term sponsorships 
with nonprofit organizations and charities.  The age of each corporation in 2000 is 
included as a control variable. 
Sample selection and description 
 Corporations selected to examine the function of corporate charitable contribution 
in this study had to meet three criteria: (1) they had to be included in Kinder, Lydenberg, 
Domini, Inc. ratings for corporate social performance during 1998 to 2000; (2) they had 
to be listed on the Corporate Giving Directory and /or the Directory of Corporate and 




period.  The data available for years 1998 to 2000 for a total of 384 firms were collected 
and formed a longitudinal cross sectional (panel) data set of 1152 observations4.  Table 2-
2 summaries several attributes of the sample firms. 
Table 2-2 Summary of the Sample Firms’ Attributes 
 Yes No 
Fortune 500  198 (52%) 186 (48%) 
Sponsoring corporate foundations 285 (74%) 99 (26%) 
Product/equipment donations 177 (46%) 207 (54%) 
In-kind services 150 (39%) 234 (61%) 
Consumer sales/ public perception oriented 175 (46%) 209 (54%) 
N= 1152 
Among the 384 sample firms, 198 (52%) are Fortune 500 corporations; 285 
(74%) fund company foundations; 177 donate products or equipment; 150 (39%) provide 
in-kind services, and 175 (46) rely more on consumer sales or public perceptions. 
Table 2-3  
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Charitable Contribution Empirical Tests 
Variables Mini Maxi Mean Standard Deviation 
 
ChaConta 0.00b 624.61 10.88 38.83 
EmpRel 0 3 0.28 0.51 
Env 0 5 0.46 0.89 
ProSaf 0 4 0.46 0.78 
IndCla na na na na 
Size (ln) 3.55 13.71 8.79 1.60 
Prof -39.05 49.85 5.83 6.26 
AdvExp 1 4,500 457.58 734.95 
Age 1 209 62.09 43.51 
N = 1152 except AdvExp N=341 
a. See table 2-1 for a complete description of the variables. 
b. Figures for Size and AdvExp are in millions. 
                                                 
4 Missing data are included in the final analysis because the test results of including missing data and 




Table 2-3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables.  The average amount 
of charitable contributions is $10.88 million, with a range of less than $1 million (low) to 
$624.61 million (high).  The average KLD employee relation concern score is 0.28, with 
a range of 0 to 3.  The average KLD concern scores of environmental performance and 
product safety are both 0.46, with the low concern scores of zero for both categories and 
high concern scores of 5 and 4 for environmental performance and product safety 
respectively.  The mean natural log of assets is $8.79 millions, with a range of $3.55 
millions (low) to $13.71 (high) millions.  The average ratio of return on assets is 5.83, 
with the low ratio of –39,05 to the high ratio of 49.85.  The average amount of 
advertising expense is $457.58 millions, with a range from $1 million (low) to $4,500 
millions (high).  The average age of firms is 62.09, with a range from 1 to 209. 
 
Analysis of the Results 
I first performed correlation analyses between variables.  Table 2-4 presents the 
bivariate correlations between the amount of charitable contribution and the KLD 
evaluation concern scores of employee relation, environmental performance, product 
safety and control variables.  All bivariate correlations between dependent and the control 
variables possess the expected sign and are all significantly correlated (at the 0.01 level).  
Correlations between independent variables show no indication that any unacceptable 





Table 2-4 Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. ChaConta        
2. EmpRel -0.01        
3. Env 0.12** 0.10**       
4. ProSaf 0.34** 0.15** 0.30**      
5. IndCla 0.26** -0.02 0.01 0.24**     
6. Size 0.30** 0.03 0.24* 0.37** 0.42**    
7. Prof 0.17** -0.11** -0.11** -0.01 0.11** -0.21**   
8. Age 0.10** -0.03 0.10** 0.07* 0.07* 0.02 0.09**  
a. See table 2-1 for a complete description of the variables. 
    AdvExp is not included in the final analysis because of data limitation. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The function of the charitable contribution model was first tested using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression with group dummy variables, which is an appropriated 
analytical procedure for panel data, but one problem emerged.  The analytical procedure 
was unable to execute because the advertising data was insufficient.  As a result, the 
control variable of AdvExp variable dropped off the model5.  The function of charitable 
contribution was then tested, and Hausman test results indicate that random model best 







                                                 






Regression Results of the Function of Charitable Contribution Test 
Dependent variable = charitable contributions of firms for 1998-2000 
 Expected sign Random Model  





Cont.  vars     
IndCla + 9.511 3.60 0.008 
Size + 4.554 1.096 0.000 
Prof + 0.363 0.146 0.012 
Age + 0.057 0.037 0.129 
Test vars.     
EmpRel +/- -0.831 1.776 0.640 
Env +/- 3.208 1.403 0.022 
ProSaf +/- 10.275 1.663 0.000 
Model Statistics     
Model  F-statistic = 12.56 
Sig.  Sig. at the 0.000 level 
R-squared  Adjusted R2 = 0.80 
a. Significance levels are two-tailed. 
 
 
 The random model is significant at the 0.000 level with a F score statistic of 12.56, 
and the adjusted coefficient of correlation (R2) is 0.80.  All four control variables (IndCla, 
Size, Prof, and Age) possess the expected signs.  Both IndCla and Size are significant at 
the 0.000 level, and Prof is at 0.10 level.  Age is not significant.  EmpRel has a negative 
sign but is not significant.  Both Env and ProSaf have a positive sign and are significant 
at the 0.05 and 0.000 level, respectively.  The overall results confirm that corporate 
charitable contributions are corporate legitimation actions.  More specifically, the 
empirical evidence supports H2b and H2c, which posit that the amount of corporate 
charitable contributions is positively associated with firm’s KLD evaluation concern 




Discussion of Research Findings 
 The findings of this empirical test are of interest to academia as well as to many 
stakeholders.  The significance of the empirical results provides evidence that corporate 
charitable contributions are a means of legitimation as theorized by Dowling and Pfeffer 
(1975) rather than a representation of corporate social performance as postulated by 
Carroll (1979; 1991).  From a legitimacy perspective, Dowling and Peffer (1975) argue 
that the amount of corporate contributions would be expected to vary over time or 
contexts when firm’s legitimacy is more or less problematic.  On the other hand, driven 
by economic factors, Carroll (1979; 1991) posits that business managers would allocate 
more resources to improve their economic performance and fewer funds to be donated to 
charities.  The significance of both Env and ProSafe with a positive sign is consistent 
with the finding of environmental disclosure research; firms that have a poor evaluation 
of environmental performance or product safety issues tend to donate more.  Thus, in 
addition to environmental disclosure as documented by Patten (1992; 2005), corporations 
also use charitable donations as a tool of legitimation. 
 The lack of significance for the employee relation variable does not support the 
hypothesis that firms donate more resource to manage their poorer employee relations.  
This finding could be explained by distinguishing internal and external factors.  
Employee relation may be considered as an internal factor rather than an external issue 
such as environmental performance and product safety evaluation.  Corporate charitable 
contributions are generally a channel between the corporation and external parties, which 




Implication of Research Results 
 The empirical evidence provided by this study has several important public policy 
applications.  Corporate charitable donations are a means of legitimation and not an 
indicator of corporate social friendliness, thus the perceived merit of corporate donation 
appears to be misleading.  Discoursing only the amount of charitable contributions within 
business financial statement, as currently proposed by the U. S. Congress, may convey an 
inaccurate corporate social performance message to the public.  In order for business 
entities to be socially responsible and accounted for their overall performance, as 
suggested by Gray et al. (1997) and others, corporations should report their financial, 
social, and environmental performances simultaneously in one statement.  By so doing, 
the public may have adequate information to evaluate or observe the performance of 
corporations. 
 In addition to business reporting issues, the public may want to reconsider the tax 
deduction policy regarding corporate charitable contributions.  Tax deduction of 
corporate donations is intended to encourage business entities to share their resources 
with the society.  However, as evidenced by this the results of this study, corporations 
donate resources not to be socially accountable but to attempt to purchase their social 







Conclusions and Limitations 
   
 The objective of this study was to empirically test whether corporate charitable 
contributions are an indicator of corporate social performance as theorized by Carroll 
(1979; 1991) and Wood (1991) or corporate legitimation action as theorized by Dowling 
and Pfeffer (1975).  The results of this study provide strong empirical evidence that 
charitable contribution is a legitimation tool used by corporation in managing their social 
legitimacy.  Firms that have a poorer environmental or product safety evaluation score 
tend to donate more than firms that receive a better evaluation score in these two domains.  
This finding confirms that legitimacy theory is an appropriate lens for analyses of 
corporate donation and that factors other than economic performance are important in 
social and environmental accounting research.  The study results also suggest that a 
concurrent business statement of corporate financial, social and environmental 
performance would be an appropriate reporting approach.    
 Several future research suggestions emerged from the results of this study.  First, 
the relationship between corporate charitable contribution and other dimensions of 
corporate performance could be tested.  In addition to environmental performance and 
product safety issue, corporate governance structure, composition of the board, and 
community relation are also important aspects of corporate social performance.  This 
study could also be replicated using other social performance evaluation ratings.  Finally, 
identification of the recipients of corporate donation could verify the intention and 




 The findings of this study are subject to several limitations.  First, the amount of 
direct giving, product donations, and in-kind service are self reported, which may not be 
accurate.  Second, there is no commonly acceptable value standard for in-kind services.  
Finally, the empirical tests were performed on large U. S. public corporations that may 
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CURRENT TAX LAWS AND THE FULFULLMENT OF CORPORATE 
FOUNDATIONS’ SOCIAL FUNCTIONS: 
EVIDENCE FROM 990-RETURNS OF PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 
Introduction 
During the twentieth century, United States (U. S.) public policy regarding 
corporate managers’ rights to authorize charitable donations of corporate resources has 
come full circle.  At the beginning of the century, corporate managers were not allowed 
to make any charitable donations because many court rulings stated that giving business 
resources away without anything in return was beyond the power of management 
(Bormann, 1994).  Currently, however, every state’s corporation statute grants businesses 
the right to make donations1 (Balotti and Hanks, 1999; Kahn, 1997).  At present, 
corporations may deduct charitable donations (including giving to their sponsored 
foundations) up to 10 percent of their annual modified taxable income (Internal Revenue 
Code Section 170 (b)(2)).   
Due in part to this favorable tax treatment, business corporations are believed to 
be more proactive in managing their charitable giving agenda and attempt to directly 
control the amounts, recipients, and timing of their contributions (Werbel and Carter, 
2002; Jones, 1994).  Many corporations use corporate (company-sponsored) foundations 
                                                 
1 Currently, every state and the District of Columbia have a statute enabling its corporations to make 
charitable donations.   Although the language used by different philanthropy statutes may vary slightly, 
these statutes are generally unrestrictive as to the amount of the contributions and its beneficiaries.  Also, 






                                                
to handle some or all of their donations (Himmelstein, 1997).  A corporate foundation is a 
tax-exempt private foundation that receives its funds from a profit-seeking business 
corporation, but is legally separate from its sponsoring company.   
The number of corporate foundations has increased 26% from 2,018 in 2000 to 
2,549 in 2003.  The amount of funds distributed by corporate foundations has also 
increased 15 % from $3.02 to $3.47 billion in 2000 and 2003 respectively.  However, the 
amount of assets possessed by these foundations has decreased from $16 billion in 2000 
to $15.5 billion in 2003 (Atienza, 2005).  Using a foundation as a giving vehicle seems to 
be a trend of many business entities.    
Corporate foundations’ funds are partially subsidized through tax deductions.2  In 
addition, tax provisions for private foundations, in comparison to tax provisions for 
corporations, provide many economic advantages.  For instance, the current excise tax 
rate on a foundation’s investment income is only 2%, while the top corporate rate is 
35%.3  These favorable tax treatments imply that the society at large believes foundation 
funds are used for the public interest.   
The purpose of this study is twofold.  First, this study investigates the relationship 
between the current tax laws and the fulfillment of corporate foundations’ social 
functions.  Theoretically, private foundations are expected to fund leading research that 
may bring alternative solutions to social issues (Andrews, 1965; Zurcher, 1972; Heifetz, 
et al., 2004).  Current tax laws, however, neither distinguish the functions between 
 
2 Internal Revenue Code Sections 170 and 503(c)(3). 
3 Internal Revenue Code Sections 509(a) and 4941.  The provision of the 1969 Tax Reform Act imposed an 
excise tax of 4% on the income a foundation derives from investment, but the current excise tax rate is 




private foundations and charities nor require or provide any incentive for foundations to 
fund research.  This lack of differentiation is an important public policy issue because if 
current tax laws do not facilitate foundations to fulfill their social functions, amendments 
to tax provisions for private foundations appear to be needed.  Second, this study 
examines whether the giving behavior of corporate foundations is motivated primarily by 
the tax advantage or by a desire to strategically manage their parent company’s business 
environment.     
This study contributes to both the accounting and nonprofit organization literature 
because existing corporate foundation research has concentrated only on sponsoring 
corporations (Webb, 1992; Werbel and Carter, 2002) with little or no consideration on 
the payout behaviors of corporate foundations.  Corporate foundations’ payout behaviors 
are important because the size of their endowment, donations and contributions are 
substantial (Atienza, 2005; Stencel, 1998), and most importantly, private foundations 
have specified social functions to fulfill.     
The data collected and analyzed in this study are not based on perception or 
estimation but on the actual activities of corporate foundations.  Although previous 
studies (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Navarro, 1988; Wokutch and Spencer, 1987; Kedia 
and Kuntz, 1981; Levy and Shatto, 1980) have attempted to investigate corporations’ 
charitable giving activities, obtaining an accurate measurement of business’s direct and 
in-kind giving has been extremely difficult.   Achieving correct measurement is difficult 
for two reasons.  First, neither the current state corporation law nor the federal securities 




(Brudney and Ferrell, 2002; Kahn, 1997).  Second, even if they report the amount of 
giving voluntarily, there are no agreed-upon standards for valuing gifts of in-kind goods 
and services. 
Unlike direct giving and in-kind donation, the actual charitable activities of 
company-sponsored foundations are publicly available from their tax returns filed 
annually with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  The institutionalized charitable 
activities undertaken by a corporate foundation are likely to reflect the social and political 
interests of its sponsoring corporation (Heald, 1970; Himmelstein, 1997; Kroll, 1991; 
Troy, 1982).  As a result, the data collected from corporate foundations are considered 
the best measure currently available to examine corporations’ charitable giving behaviors. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows.  The next section begins with a 
brief review of the legal history of corporate charitable giving and company-sponsored 
foundations.  Thereafter, the social functions of foundations and charitable organizations 
are discussed and the first hypothesis is presented.  Following that, two theoretically 
grounded motivations for corporate foundation giving are reviewed.  The two motivations 
are the tax advantage hypothesis and the strategic management hypothesis.  These 
hypotheses are then empirically tested.  Finally, the findings and implications for research 
and public policy are presented. 
Legal History and Tax Policies Related to Corporate Donations 
  The legal history regarding corporate donations in the U. S. reveals substantial 




                                                
managers to make any charitable donation from which the company did not directly 
benefit (Werbel and Carter, 2002).  However, in 1953, in A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. 
v. Barlow, et al., the New Jersey Superior Court judge stated that under common law 
every corporation has the right and a duty to make charitable giving.  As a result, the 
“beyond the power” policy was overruled.   
Additionally, in 1955, the court ruling of the Union Pacific Railroad case 
discarded the direct benefit rule pertaining to corporate donations.  The judge stated that 
whether or not certain business actions directly benefit the company should be 
determined by the executives because they knew better than the judge what was in the 
firm’s best interest (Webb, 1992; Werbel and Carter, 2002).  As a result, many state 
statutes regarding business donations were amended.   
Currently, a business corporation may deduct charitable donations up to 10 
percent of the corporation’s modified taxable income for the year when given to any 
domestic 501(c)(3) organization including donations to its sponsored foundations.4  Any 
charitable donation that is not currently deductible due to the percentage limitation may 
be carried over for up to five years.5  In other words, under the current charitable tax 
provisions, the government is willing to subsidize business’ charitable giving through tax 
deduction.  For instance, given a corporate tax rate of 35%, within the $3.3 billion of 
 
4 In 1935, the Internal Revenue Code was amended to permit charitable deduction in an amount not to 
exceed 5% of a firm’s taxable income, and currently the deductibility of gifts is up to 10 % of the 
corporation’s annual adjusted gross income (Internal Revenue Code sections 170(b)(2) was modified in 
1981.) 




                                                
grant money given by corporations to their sponsored foundations in 2003 (Atienza, 
2005), approximately $1.2 billion is subsidized by the public through tax deduction.     
An additional amount of tax reduction is given by the tax treatments available to 
private foundations.  Company-sponsored foundations held approximately $16 billion in 
assets in 2003 (Atienza, 2005).  The excise taxes on the return on these assets were 
generally 2 percent 6, which is substantially lower than the taxes (35 percent) on identical 
returns to for-profit business entities.  Moreover, corporate foundations are required to 
pay out only 5% of its asset value for charitable purposes each year, and grants as well as 
administrative expenses are included in this minimum payout amount.7   Because of these 
tax advantages, business corporations appear to be more proactive in managing their 
giving programs (Mescon and Tillson, 1987).  Many corporations use their own 
foundations to maintain control over the amounts, recipients, and timing of their 
contributions (Werbel and Carter, 2002; Himmelstein, 1997; Jones, 1994). 
The current study is designed to test two hypotheses.  First, this study examines 
whether the current public policy, as evidenced by Internal Revenue Code Section 170; 
503(c)(3) and 4942, facilitates or hinders corporate foundations from fulfilling their 
social functions.  Theoretically, the distinct function of private foundations is supposed to 
fund leading research that may provide alternative solutions to social issues (Andrews, 
1965; Zurcher, 1972; Heifetz, et al., 2004).   Second, by examining the payout activities 
 
6 Internal Revenue Code Sections 509(a) and 4941.  The provision of the 1969 Tax Reform Act imposed an 
excise tax of 4% on the income a foundation derives from investment, but the current excise tax rate is 
generally 2%, and some foundations may be qualified for a reduced excise tax rate of 1%. 
7 Internal Revenue Code Section 4942. The pay-out requirement requires foundations to pay out 5% of its 
asset value (including grants, and necessary and reasonable administrative expenses) for charitable purpose 




of corporate foundations, this study analyzes whether tax advantage or strategic 
management is the main incentive for foundations’ giving.  The literature of economics, 
management, nonprofit organizations and political science on corporate foundations 
suggests two possible rationales for businesses to establish foundations as their giving 
vehicle--tax advantage (Clotfelter, 1985; Heald, 1970; Webb, 1992; Webb, 1996) and 
strategic management of corporate environment (Bormann, 1994; Webb, 1992; Werbel 
and Carter, 2002; White and Bartolomeo, 1980; Zurcher, 1972).   However, the previous 
empirical work attempting to test these different motivations is by no means conclusive. 
Theoretical Development and Research Questions 
Justification of Private Foundations 
Roelofs (2003) states that the political system of a democratic capitalistic society, 
such as the United States, is maintained in two ways: the state and the civil society.  The 
former controls through force and laws and is complemented by the latter that produces 
consent without resort to force.  Nonprofit organizations are theorized to be critical to the 
effective functioning of a nation that has a strong economic market and, comparatively, a 
weak state.  Hansmann (1980, 1981) argues that the economic, production and related 
tasks performed by the business and commercial world are primarily governed by the 
market through a contractual agreement.  Private nonprofit organizations such as 
foundations, however, are a response to market failure.  For instance, when the 
purchasers and the recipients of the goods or service are separated and especially when 




determine whether the goods or services they pay for are in fact ever delivered or 
performed.  In this situation, the purchasers would prefer to rely on a nonprofit entity 
than to contract with a business organization because profit-seeking business is assumed 
to have a relatively strong incentive to skimp on the services it promises and to divert 
most or all of its revenue directly to its owners (Gunn, 2004).   
In addition, the concept of market failure also helps to explain the prevalence of 
nonprofits as private-market producers of certain specific goods such as public, 
charitable, and certain mixed services.   Abzug and Webb (1999) state the market failure 
of public and similar goods occurs when the quantity of certain specific goods and 
services, such as healthcare and insurance, provided by businesses is inadequate. This 
occurs when business entities doubt that consumers have the ability to pay for the goods 
and services they request, which leads to insufficient supply, and at the same time the 
government fails to compensate.  In these situations, nonprofits are theorized to be more 
suitable for goods/service providers. 
The Council on Foundations (1975) states that the justification of foundation and 
charitable giving are both primarily based on three beliefs: (1) the importance of 
encouraging voluntarism in the fulfilling of social needs; (2) the suitability of 
decentralization of funding our educational, cultural, and charitable services; and (3) the 
usefulness of having some alternatives to many government services, even when those 




Functional Differences between Foundations and Charities 
Although private foundations are funded by charitable contributions, the social 
expectation of a private foundation is somewhat different from traditional charities.  
Roelofs (2003) states the distinction between foundation grant-making and charitable 
giving is in the “root cause” metaphor.  Whereas the purpose of traditional charities is to 
provide relief to the poor, the distressed or the underprivileged, and to lessen the burdens 
of government, the purpose of foundations is to do something about the deeper causes 
that lead to suffering and inequality in the first place.  For instance, the research on and 
discovery of vaccine treatment is aimed at preventing the suffering that accompanies 
epidemics.  Furthermore, Andrews (1965, p.5) emphasizes that the purpose of 
foundations “is not relief or even cure, it is prevention, research, and discovery.”  Heifetz 
et al. (2004) argue that if foundations are to achieve their social role, they are well 
positioned to do so through imaginative and even controversial leadership.  Society as a 
whole anticipates foundations (with partially public subsidized endowments) will fund 
innovative programs, leading research and work on the frontlines of social problems, and 
hope these efforts would provide alternative solutions to social issues in which society 
may progress (Zurcher, 1972).    
Foundations also are supposed to be more flexible and adaptable to specific 
situations and pressing social needs than governmental appropriation and governmental 
agencies normally can be (Zurcher, 1972).  Foundations, as independent legal entities, are 




critically review governmental programs and policies.  Zurcher (1972, p.3) further 
emphasizes: 
It is particularly desirable to maintain an institution like the foundation 
because, among private institutions concerned with public ends, the 
foundation is peculiarly equipped to command the resources and the  
freedom of action to provide alternatives to governmental policy and, 
if it will, to take the lead in exploring new and uncharted directions  
in which society might move.  All this … makes for a more 
open and a more enlightened society. 
 
 
The function of private foundations differs from that of traditional charities.  
Private foundations equipped with publicly subsidized financial resources and 
administrative autonomy are expected to support research projects, institutions, and 
scholars who investigate social problems and public policy issues (Zurcher, 1972).  
However, corporate foundations, being funded by business, may prefer to associate with 
charities rather than to be involved in social issues research or projects because many 
prior studies (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Wood, 1990) suggest that corporate donations to 
charities is usually perceived as a friendly corporate social activity.  Moreover, Roberts 
(1992) empirically verifies that the establishment of corporate foundations has had a 




other words, corporations that use foundations as their donation vehicle are more 
proactive in demonstrating that they are socially friendly entities.   
On the other hand, funding activities concerning social and public policy issues 
could be an extremely valuable social function of corporate foundations but it also could 
expose the sponsoring corporations to unnecessary business risk.   Mcilnay (1997, p. 26) 
states: 
Involvement in public policy is a two-edged sword for [corporate]  
foundations: at once perhaps their single most substantive opportunity 
for public service and their single greatest vulnerability to criticism. 
  
 Although corporate foundations are legally separated from the funding 
organizations, the grant-making behaviors of foundations are likely to be influenced by 
the giving policies and social interests of the parent company because foundations are 
financially and administratively controlled by the sponsoring corporations (Heald, 1970; 
Himmelstein, 1997; Kroll, 1991; Troy, 1982).  In a capitalistic society, business entities 
are believed to be more concerned with their economic benefits as long as the pursuits of 
their business interest are within the provisions of laws.  The current tax provisions 
neither request nor provide any incentive for corporate foundations to support public 
policy studies; grant monies given to traditional charities and policy research receives the 
same tax treatment.  Consequently, corporate foundations operating in a capitalistic 
society are theorized to have a preference to provide funding to traditional charities rather 




organizations enjoy the same degree of tax benefits, and perhaps the same amount of 
name recognition, but also prevents many criticisms.  Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Corporate sponsored foundations will give a significantly 
higher amount of grant monies to traditional charities than they will give 
to research and public policy studies. 
 
Giving behavior of corporate foundations 
 Corporate foundations, as tax exempt private organizations, must follow the rules 
prescribed by Section 509(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and the Tax Reform Act of 
1969 (TRA69).  These rules not only provide guidelines on whom are the legitimate grant 
recipients but also set the annual minimum grants payout requirement.  The minimum 
payout rule is the amount that a foundation is required to expend for charitable purposes 
including grants, and necessary and reasonable administrative expenses.  In general, a 
foundation is required to pay out at least 5 percent of the market value of its assets each 
year. 
The combination of charitable deduction tax provisions for corporate donations 
and the minimum payout requirements for corporate foundations might lead to different 
giving behavior of corporations and foundations.  For instance, assume a company with a 




company has at least three legitimate options: (1) no donation; perhaps dividends, (2) 
direct donation to charities, and (3) donation to its sponsored foundation.  However, the 
social consequences of these three corporate actions may be different. 
 
Table 3-1  
The Relationship Between Corporation Actions and the Net Resource Change to Society 
 No Donation 
Keep $ 100  
$ 100 Donation 
to Public 
Charities 
$ 100 Donations 
to Its Own 
Foundations 
Resource Kept by the 
Corporation $65 $0 $0
Amount paid in Taxes 
$35 $0 $0
Resource Available to 
Govern/Nonprofits $35 $100 $ 5~100
Net Change of Fund to Society 
Compared w/no charitable 
donations  
$65 $ (30) ~ $65
Assuming a company with a marginal tax rate of 35% has $100 of net taxable income 
available for donation. 
 
As indicated by table 3-1, the first option that the company can choose is to keep 
and reinvest the net income in its business and pay an income tax of $35.  As a result, the 
company keeps $65, and $35 becomes tax revenue to the public, which is the primary 
financial resource to support governmental functions.  Second, the company can donate 
the $100 directly to charity.  This option results in an increase of $100 to charity and $35 
of tax loss for the government, but the overall net public resource increase is $65 as 
compared to the first option.  This option could be considered the intent of the charitable 
deduction provision.  The government is willing to subsidize the tax revenue of $35 and 




                                                
the company gives away the $100 to socially desirable organizations.  In other words, 
within the $100 donation, the company’s actually giving is $65 and the $35 is sponsored 
by the public via tax deduction (or forgone in tax revenue).   
Finally, instead of giving to other charities directly, the company can donate the 
$100 to its own foundation and received a deduction of $35.  Although the company 
receives the same tax benefit regardless of whether it donates directly or through its 
foundation, the actual resource available to the public may vary significantly.  The 
amount may vary because foundations are only required to give out a minimum of five 
percent of its assets, which total $100 in this example.  If only $5 of the $100 is given out 
to socially desirable programs by the company-sponsored foundation, the public 
temporarily experiences8 a deficit of $30 for this particular donation as compared to 
option 1.  It is because $35 of tax revenue is lost and only $5 of grant money is 
distributed to the society.  Through examining the giving behavior of corporate 
foundations, we might be able to infer the purpose of using foundations as a means for 
business charitable giving. 
Giving motivations of corporate foundation 
The literature suggests two possible rationales - tax advantage and strategic 
management of corporate environment– that may explain why so many corporate 
foundations come into being and persist indefinitely. Many researchers (Clotfelter, 1985; 
Heald, 1970; Webb, 1992; Webb, 1996) argue the most important reasons for using a 
 




corporate foundation have to do with the tax code.  First, funds donated by the company 
for charitable purpose do not have to be handed over immediately to the ultimate users 
but can be transferred to the foundations.  Thus, companies can increase donations in 
more profitable years to benefit from tax deduction and not immediately lose control of 
the funds.  Second, corporations can fund foundations with appreciated property and 
foundations can turn around and sell the property and pay no capital gains tax on earnings.  
Third, foundations’ funds can be distributed regularly to chosen recipients because the 
payout requirement is only 5% of the asset.   
If the characteristics of corporate foundations are similar to other nonprofit 
organizations, tax benefit plays an important role in their reporting and giving behaviors.  
For instance, Yetman (2001) documents that nonprofit organizations allocate expenses 
from their tax-exempt to their taxable activities to reduce their tax liabilities.  Moreover, 
Sansing and Yetman (2002) find that large and professionally managed foundations have 
a tendency to minimize their payouts.  Thus, the tax advantage hypothesis is postulated: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The annual amount of contributions given by a corporate 
foundation does not significantly exceed its minimum payout requirement. 
 
Still, others (Neiheisel, 1994; Werbel and Carter, 2002; Williams and Barrett, 
2000) argue that managing the sponsoring corporation’s business environment is the most 
important reason to set up a corporate foundation.  Neiheisel (1994) argues that 




which may reduce government interference and special interest group criticism.  Werbel 
and Carter (2002) find that CEO’s influence on corporate charitable contribution is 
reduced when giving is administrated by corporate foundations.  This control may in turn 
reduce the pressure from stockholders who assume that corporate executives use 
corporate giving for their personal gain rather than the benefit of the business.   
Additionally, William and Barrett (2000) document that corporate charitable 
giving mitigates unfavorable corporate reputations caused by environmental violations.  
This conjecture is consistent with the findings of Study two, that corporate charitable 
contribution is a legitimation action undertaken by business when their business practices 
are in question.  Corporations, therefore, use donations as the premium of social and 
political insurance to “purchase” a favorable business environment that may help them 
continue to survive. 
To maintain a favorable business environment requires continuous efforts.  As a 
result, corporate foundations become an important strategic tool for corporations to 
continually purchase their “social and political insurance” through stable charitable 
giving even if company profits are unsound and available funds are limited (Hillman, 
1965; Webb, 1992).   
Moreover, as documented by the findings of Study Two of this dissertation, 
corporations that receive poorer social performance evaluation scores tend to make more 
donations then corporations that receive better evaluation scores.  In order to control the 
influence of their parent company’s legitimacy need in corporate foundation’s payout 




corporation should be accounted for.  Thus, the strategic management hypothesis 
suggests that:  
 
Hypothesis 2b: The annual amount of contribution given by corporate 
foundations significantly exceeds the minimum payout requirement after 
controlling for the legitimacy need of the parent company. 
 
 The tax advantage hypothesis and the strategic management hypothesis 
mentioned above are used to test the payout behavior of corporate foundations.  This 
study does not suggest that these two hypotheses are mutually exclusive.  The purpose of 
this examination is to identify, from the empirical results, the primary incentive of using 
corporate foundations as a conduit for business donations. 
Research Design  
Sample and data collection 
 181 corporate foundations collected in the newest edition of Corporate 
Foundation Profiles by the Foundation Center (Jones, 2002) are used as the sample 
foundations.  The data of these 181 foundations contained in the profiles are used to test 
hypothesis 1.  Corporate Foundation Profiles (Jones, 2002) provides information on 
corporate foundations that gave at least $1 million in the year of 1998 or 1999.  Each 
profile includes foundation giving-interest areas, application guidelines, recently awarded 




others.  Thus, the profiles provide standardized comparisons for corporate foundations’ 
giving across business companies, which are required to hypothesis 1.  Corporate 
foundations selected to test hypotheses 2a and 2b are primary based on the set of 181 
foundations used to test hypothesis 1.  However, in order to control for the legitimacy 
needs of the sponsoring firms, the parent company of a foundation must also have 
reported KLD social performance scores.  There were 108 foundations that met the 
criteria. 
 The amount of foundation giving and required minimum payout are obtained 
from the annual tax returns filed by corporate foundations with the IRS in Form 990-PF 
(Return of Private Foundation).  The 1996 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 requires tax-exempt 
organizations to disclose their tax returns.  Moreover, the IRS has agreed to provide the 
optically scanned Form 990 (Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax) to 
institutions such as The Foundation Center, Guide Star, and the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS), where return data are available to the general public. 
 Form 990-PF presents the basic financial statements of private foundations.  
Although the report is financial in nature, other relevant information is also included (see 
Appendix).  For instance, Part I of Form 990-PF is an analysis of revenue and expenses: 
the amount of all revenue, operating and administrative expenses are listed where the 
total amount of contribution received and given are reported.  Compensation of officers, 
directors, trustees and key employees are stated.  Part II and III contain detailed reports of 
balance sheet items.  Part IV reports capital gains or losses on investment income.  Part V 




information to determine whether they qualify for the reduced 1% tax on net investment 
income.  The payout information for the past five years and the payout amount reported 
in the current tax returns (in Part X to XII) make six years of panel data available. 
 The 990-PF tax returns for the year of 2002 of the 108 corporate foundations were 
collected from the Foundation Center, a non-profit research organization that archives 
Form 990s.  The Part V of the tax returns contains six-years of data for each foundation 
but due to the availability of the KLD data, the years of 1998 to 2002 data were used in 
this study.  This formed a panel data set including 540 observations that is used to 
examine hypothesis two.   
Measurements 
 The measurements of hypothesis one in this study were obtained from Corporate 
Foundation Profile (Jones, 2000), which contains information of 181 corporate 
foundations for the year of 1998 or 1999.  Hypothesis one, the relationship between the 
current tax policy and the fulfillment of corporate foundations’ social function, is 
measured by the difference between the amount of grant money donated to support 
traditional charities and the amount donated to support research and public policies 
studies.  The amounts given by corporate foundations are dichotomized into funds for 
research organizations and for charities according to the mission and the nature of the 
receiving organization.  In this study, institutions undertaking any preventive, discovery, 
and policy-related studies are considered to be research organizations.  On the other hand, 




are not limited to, the following: the organization’s purpose is for relief of the poor, the 
distressed, or the underprivileged; advancement of religion; improvement of education or 
science; maintenance of public buildings, lessening the burdens of government and other 
activities with similar goals.   
 Among these charitable donations, the purpose of grants to educational 
organizations is unclear whether it is used to add new buildings or to support research.  
According to the IRS (Publication No. 557), contributions to schools can be used to 
improve facilities, to endow a professorial chair, to pay employees’ salaries, to fund 
student activities, or to support research.  For the purpose of this study, the contributions 
to higher educational institutions are assumed to be used for research purpose.  Under this 
assumption, the amount of research grant money given by corporate foundations for 
research is inflated or overstated.  If there is still a significant difference between the 
amount of grant money given to traditional charities and the amount of inflated research 
grant money, the test result of hypothesis one will be strongly supported.  In addition, 
Galaskiewicz (1997) reports that the industry attributes of the sponsoring company are 
likely to affect the amount of grant money to certain social institutions.  Thus corporate 
foundations sponsored by pharmaceutical companies may be more likely to support 
medical related studies and research.  This study, however, does not control for this 
possible industry effect because, as stated previously, inflated research amounts may 





                                                
The data used to test hypotheses two were obtained directly from tax returns of 
corporate foundations (990-PF).  Hypothesis two, which is concerned with the primary 
motivation for corporate foundations giving, is measured by the difference between the 
amount of total grant money and the minimum amount of payout requirement.  The total 
giving amount and the fair market value of average assets of each corporate foundation 
over a six- year period are reported on Part V of Form 990-PF.  The minimum amount of 
payout requirement is equaled to 5% of the total average asset’s market value.   
 The control variable, the legitimacy need of the parent company, is measured by 
the sum of the concerns scores reported by the social research firm Kinder, Lydengerg, 
Domini’s (KLD) Socrates database9.  Although several other corporate social 
performance reports are available, the numbers of companies or the dimensions of 
corporate social performance covered by these reports are limited.  On the other hand, 
KLD data offer several desirable qualities.  KLD has quantifiable social records of over 
3,000 publicly traded U.S. companies across a range of dimensions pertaining to business 
related social concerns.  Moreover, KLD’s data have been used extensively in a growing 
body of largely management-based U.S. research on corporate social performance issues 
(e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997a, 1997b; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Agle et al., 1999; 
Berman et al., 1999; Greening and Turban, 2000; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Ruf et al., 
2001; Rehbein et al., 2004), and recently have also been applied in accounting research 
(e.g. Cho, Patten and Roberts, 2005), and the second study of this dissertation.  Most 
 
9 Socrates is a proprietary database program issued by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & CO. Inc. that provides 






importantly, these data have been validated as the best currently available measurements 
of corporate social performance (Sharfman, 1996; Szwajkowski and Figlewicz, 1999).  A 
complete and detailed description of the KLD rating system is available from Waddock 
and Graves (1997a, 1997b) and KLD’s website (www.kld.com). 
 KLD separately assigns strengths and concerns across eight social performance 
dimensions.  These dimensions are community, corporate governance, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, human rights, product, and others (KLD, 2003).  The 
sum of the concern scores of the eight dimensions are used to measure the sponsoring 
corporations’ needs of legitimacy for the selected years. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are tested by regression.  The difference between the 
amount of total contributions (total grant monies plus administrative expenditures10) and 
the amount of minimum payout requirement is the dependent variable.  KLD concern 
scores are the control variables.  If the coefficient of the constant is significant with a 
negative sign, then hypothesis 2a is supported, which indicates that the annual amount of 
contributions given by a corporate foundation does not significantly exceed its minimum 
payout requirement after their parent company’s legitimacy needs are accounted for.  
This result suggests that the giving behavior of corporate foundations is primarily guided 
by tax benefits.  On the other hand, if the coefficient of the constant is significant with a 
positive sign, then hypothesis 2b prevails, which support that the annual amount of 
contribution given by corporate foundations significantly exceeds the minimum payout 
requirement after controlling for the legitimacy need of the parent company.  Thus, the 
                                                 
10 On average the amount of administrative expenditures is 4.19% of the total contributions with a range of 




main motivation of corporate foundations’ giving is to strategically manage firms’ 
environment. 
 
Analysis of the Results 
Analytical procedures 
 The description of the sample corporate foundation is presented in Table 3-2.  The 
average ending asset was $49.43 million, with a range of 0 to $441.25 million.  The 
average age of the foundation at the end of 1998 or 1999 was 30.90, with a range of 1 to 
82.  The foundation donated, on average, $9.52 million to various organizations, with the 
least amount donated being $1.10, and the highest amount donated being $67.89 million. 
 
Table 3-2 Summary of Sample Corporate Foundations 
 Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation
Assetsa 0 441.25 49.43 76.93 
Age 1 82 30.90 16.60 
Total Grant given 1.10 67.89 9.52 10.56 
Grants to Charities 0.92 63.27 8.10 9.02 
Grants to research/public policy studies 0 11.21 1.42 2.10 
a in million except for age.  N=181 
Source: Corporate Foundation Profiles by The Foundation Center (2002). 
 
 Hypothesis one, the difference between the amount of grant money to traditional 




and is significant at the 0.000 level with a t score statistic of 11.61.  A summary of 
corporate foundation grant money distribution by recipient and percentage is presented in 
Table 3-3.  The corporate foundations gave, on average, approximately $8.10 million to 
traditional charities, which accounted for 85.08 percentage of the total grant money; 
followed by higher education $1.21(12.71%), public policy studies $0.09 (0.95%), 
medical research $0.08 (0.84%), and other research $0.04 million (0.42%). 
 
Table 3-3 
Summary of Corporate Foundation Payout Behaviors by Recipient and Percentage 







Amount* (mean) 8.10 1.21 0.09 0.08 0.04 
Percentage 85.08 12.71 0.95 0.84 0.42 
* in millions 
 
Hypothesis two was tested using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with 
group dummy variables, and Hausman tests indicate random model is appropriated for 
the data set.  Table 3-4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables, and the test 







Descriptive Statistics  
 Min Max Mean S. D. 







0 16 3.60 2.87 
N=540  * in thousand ($) 
 
 The difference between the amount of grant monies and the required payout, on 
average, is $12,386.99 thousand with a range of $ -1,269.29 to $ 161,848.76 thousand.  
The sponsoring company’s legitimacy needs, on average, is 3.60 with a range of 0 to 16, 
as measured by KLD rating scores.  The correlation between the KLD scores and the 
amount of grant monies above the required payout is 0.279, which is significant at the 
0.01 level.  
 
Table 3-5 
Regression results for corporate foundation giving motivation test 
Dependent variable = difference between the amount of total contributions and required 
payout for 1998-2002. 
 Expected 
sign 
OLS Random Model  





KLD + 1498.47 268.95 0.000 
Constant +/- 6992.50 1789.67 0.000 
     
Model Statistics     
Model  F-statistic = 20.22 
Sig.  Sig. at the 0.000 level 
R-squared  Adjusted R2 = 0.79 
N =540.  Mean KLD score is 3.60 with a range of 0 to 16.  
 The random model is significant at the 0.000 level with a F score statistic of 20.22, 




variable (KLD) and constant are both significant with a positive sign.  The overall results 
support hypothesis 2b.       
Discussion of research findings 
 The particular social functions of private foundations such as corporate sponsored 
foundations are theorized to provide alternative solutions to social issues by supporting 
research and public policy studies.  However, the empirical results indicate that corporate 
foundations gave more than 85% of their grant monies to traditional charities, and less 
than 15% of their grant monies were used to carry out their social function.  Whether the 
resources of foundations should be used primarily to substitute governmental 
expenditures, to mitigate social inequality or to support research that may provide 
answers to challenging social problems are important public policy issues. The current 
tax laws do not appear to require that foundations fulfill their commonly agreed upon 
specific social function.  Amendments to the current tax laws may be necessary if society 
agrees that the social function of foundations is different from that of charities and desire 
foundations to carry out their specific social roles. 
 The timing for corporations to donate (transfer) funds to their sponsored 
foundations, as suggested by many economic studies, may be primarily motivated by tax 
advantages.  The research results, however, reveal that one primary motivation of 
corporate foundation giving, the resources outflow from foundations to society, is a 
strategic desire to manage their parent company’s business environment.  Corporate 




corporate foundations donate even more monies when their parent company’s social 
legitimacy need is high.  After the influence of sponsoring corporation’s legitimacy need 
is controlled, foundations still gave out more grant money than necessary.  These 
research findings provide a strong support to hypothesis 2b that corporations use their 
foundation giving as the premium of social and political insurance to manage their 
business environment.  In addition, the giving behavior of corporate foundation seems to 
be different from that of other private foundation.  Sansing and Yetman (2002) document 
that private foundation in general have a tendency to minimize their payouts.  The results 
of this current study concentrated only on corporate foundations, however, indicate that 
the annual amount of contribution given by corporate foundations extensively exceeds 
the minimum payout requirement.    
 According to the results of this current study, one may question the social value of 
corporate foundations in their current practices.  As private foundations, they do not 
provide adequate funds to support research; as corporate foundations, they are used by 
their parent company as a strategic instrument to manage the sponsoring company’s 
social legitimacy and business surroundings. 
Conclusions and Limitations 
 There were two purposes in this study.  The first one was to empirically test the 
relationship between the current tax laws and the fulfillment of corporate foundations’ 
social roles.  The second objective was to examine whether tax advantage or strategic 




indicate that the current tax laws do not provide incentives for foundations to support 
research and public policy studies.  The research findings also reveal that corporate 
foundation giving is motivated more by a desire for strategic management than tax 
benefits.  However, this study does not exclude tax advantage as one of the motivations 
of corporate foundation giving.   
 Several future research directions are suggested by the findings of this present 
study.  First, the effects of tax laws on the selection of recipients or grant monies 
allocation between charities and research could be tested by experimental studies.  
Second, this study could be refined using direct measures of managers’ understanding of 
their legitimacy needs as control variable.  Finally, the social functions of foundations 
could be further identified by historical review. 
 As with any research, this study has certain limitations.  This study has relied on 
the categorization scheme provided by Corporate Foundation Profiles; a detailed 
breakdown as to who were the recipients of corporate foundations giving was beyond the 
scope of this current study.  The empirical tests were performed on large corporate 
foundations that may restrict the generalizability of the findings.  The social roles of 





Abzug, R., & Webb, N. J. (1999). Relationships between nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations: a stakeholder perspective.  Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 28(4), 416-431. 
 
Agle, B. R., Mitchell, R. K., & Sonnenfeld, J. A. (1999). Who matters to CEO? An 
investigation of stakeholder attributes and salience, corporate performance, and 
CEO values. Academy of Management Journal, 42(3), 507-525. 
Andrews, F. E. (1965). Foundations: 20 viewpoints. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Atienza, J (2005). Foundation growth and giving estimates. The Foundations Today 
Series. New York: The Foundation Center. 
Balotti, R. F., & Hanks, J. J. Jr. (1999). Giving at the office: A reappraisal of charitable 
contributions by corporations. The Business Lawyer, 54 (3), 965-996. 
Berman, S. L., Wicks, A. C., Kotha, S., & Jones, T. M. (1999). Does stakeholder 
orientation matter? The relationship between stakeholder management models and 
firm financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 488-506. 
Bormann, C. J. (1994). Effectiveness in company-sponsored foundations: A utilization of 
the competing values framework.  Ph. D. Dissertation.  University of North Texas. 
Brudney, V., & Ferrell, A. (2002). Corporate charitable giving. The University of 
Chicago Law Review, 69, 1-27. 
Cho, C. H., Patten, D. M., & Roberts, R. W. (2005). Corporate political strategy: an 
examination of the relation between political expenditures, environmental 





Clotfelter, C. T. (1985). Federal tax policy and charitable giving.  The University of 
Chicago press, Chicago and London. 
Council on Foundations (1975). Private foundations and the 1969 Tax Reform Act. In 
Research papers. Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs. 
Washington D.C.: Department of the Treasury. 
Galaskiewicz, J. (1997). An urban rants economy revisited: Corporate charitable 
contributions in the Twin Cities, 1979-1981, 1987-1989. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 42,445-471. 
Greening, D. W., & Turban, D. B. (2000). Corporate social performance as a competitive 
advantage in attracting a quality workforce. Business and Society, 39(3), 254-280. 
Griffin, J. J., & Mahon, J. F. (1997). The Corporate social performance and corporate 
financial performance debate: twenty-five years of incomparable research. 
Business and Society, 36 (1), 5-31. 
Gunn, C. (2004). Third-Sector development: Making up for the market. New York: 
Cornell University Press. 
Hansmann, H. (1980). The role of nonprofit enterprise.  The Yale Law Journal, 89 (5), 
835-901. 
Hansmann, H. (1981). Why are nonprofit organizations exempted from corporate income 
taxation?  In Michelle White (ed.), Nonprofit Firms in a Three Sector Economy, 
pp. 115-134. Washington, D. C.: The Urban Institute. 




Heald, M. (1970). The social responsibilities of business.  Cleveland, OH: The Press of 
Case Western Reserve University. 
Heifetz, R. A., Kania, J. V., & Kramer, M. R. (2004). Leading boldly: Foundations can 
move past traditional approaches to create social change through imaginative- and 
even controversial- leadership.  Stanford Social Innovation Review (Winter), 19-
31. 
Hillman, A. J, & Keim, G. D. (2001). Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and 
social issues: what’s the bottom line? Strategic Management Journal, 22, 125-139. 
Hillman, R. C. (1965). The company sponsored foundation. In Foundations: 20 
viewpoints, ed. F. Emerson Andrews, 85-88. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Himmelstein, J. L. (1997). Looking-good and doing good: Corporate philanthropy and 
corporate power. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
Jones, F., (1994). Corporate foundation profiles.  New York: The Foundation Center. 
Jones, F., (2002). Corporate foundation profiles.  New York: The Foundation Center. 
Kahn, F. S. (1997). Pandora’s Box: Managerial discretion and the problem of corporate 
philanthropy. UCLA Law Review 44, 579-675. 
Kedia, B. L., & Kuntz, E. C. (1981). The context of social performance: An empirical 
study of Texas banks.  In L.E. Preston (ed.), Research in Corporate Social 
Performance and Policy (Vol. 2), 133-154. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
KLD Research & Analytics, Inc.,(2003). KLD Rating Data: Inclusive Social Rating 
Criteria. Cambridge, MA. 





Levy, F. K., & Shatto, G. M. (1980). Social responsibility in large electric utility firms: 
The case for philanthropy. In L.E. Preston (ed.), Research in Corporate Social 
Performance and Policy (Vol. 2), 237-249. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Mescon, T. S., & Tillson, D. J. (1987). Corporate Philanthropy: A strategic approach to 
the bottom-line.  California Management Review, 29(2):49-61.  
Mcilnay, D. P. (1997). The public/ private balancing act.  Foundation News & 
Commentary 38(3), 25-30. 
Navarro, P. (1988). Why do corporations give to charity? Journal of Business 61(1), 65-
93. 
Neiheisel, S. R. (1994). Corporate strategy and the politics of goodwill: A political 
analysis of corporate philanthropy in America. New York: Peter Lang. 
Rehbein, K., Waddock, S. & Graves, S. (2004). Understanding shareholder activism: 
 Which corporations are targeted? Business & Society, 43(3), 239-267. 
Roberts, R. W. (1992). Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure: an 
application of stakeholder theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17 (6), 
595-612. 
Roelofs, J. (2003). Foundations and public policy: The mask of pluralism. New York: 
State University of New York Press. 
Ruf, B. M., Muralidhar, K., Brown, R. M., Janney, J. J., & Paul, K. (2001). An empirical 




and financial performance: a stakeholder theory perspective. Journal of Business 
Ethics 32 (2), 143-156. 
Sansing, R. C. and Yetman, R. (2002). Prudent stewards or pyramid builders? 
 Distribution policies of private foundations.  Tuck School of Business working 
paper No. 02-18. 
Sharfman, M. (1996). A construct validity study of the KLD social performance ratings 
data. Journal of Business Ethics, 15(3), 287-297.  
Stencel, S. (1998). Ed. Foundations’ Trove. The New Corporate Philanthropy. CQ 
Researcher 8(8), 170-191. Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 
Szwajkowski, E., & Figlewicz, R. E. (1999). Evaluating corporate performance: a 
comparison of the Fortune reputation survey and the Socrates social rating 
database. Journal of Management Issues, 11(2), 137-154. 
Troy, K. (1982). The corporate contributions function. New York: Conference Board. 
Waddock, S. A., & Graves, S. B. (1997a). The corporate social performance-financial 
performance link. Strategic Management Journal, 18(4), 303-319. 
Waddock, S. A., & Graves, S. B. (1997b). Quality of management and quality of 
 stakeholder relations: are they synonymous? Business & Society, 36(3), 250-279. 
Webb, N., J. (1992). Company foundations and the economics of corporate giving. 
 Ph. D. Dissertation.  Duke University. 
Webb, N., J. (1996). Corporate profits and social responsibility: “Subsidization” of  
 corporate income under charitable giving tax laws. Journal of Economics and  




Werbel, J. D., & Carter, S. M. (2002). The CEO’s influence on corporate foundation  
 giving.  Journal of Business Ethics 40, 47-60. 
White, A. H., & Bartholomeo, J. (1982). Corporate giving: The view of chief executive 
officers of major American corporations.  Washington, D.C.: Council on 
Foundations. 
Willains, R. J., & Barrett, J. D. (2000). Corporate philanthropy, criminal activity, and 
firm reputation: is there a link? Journal of Business Ethics, 26, 341-350. 
Wokutch, R. E., & Spencer, B. A. (1987). Corporate saints and sinners: The effects of 
philanthropic and illegal activity on organizational performance.  California 
Management Review, 29(2), 62-77. 
Wood, D. J. (1991). Corporate social performance revisited. Academy of Management  
 Review, 16(4), 691-718. 
Yetman, R. J., (2001). Tax-motivated expense allocations by nonprofit organizations. 
  The Accounting Review, 76(3), 297-311. 
Zurcher, A. J., (1972). The Management of American Foundations: Administration, 






 This dissertation consists of three studies related to accounting disclosure at the 
interface of organizations and society.  The first study investigates the overlapping 
perspectives of legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and 
stakeholder theory and integrates these theories into a more cohesive meta-theory of the 
organization-society interface. Although the primary function of business entities is 
economic in nature, business entities must pursuit their economic roles in a socially 
acceptable matter.  Study one concludes that some corporations may initiate social 
activities to gain economic benefit but others may undertake the same social activities to 
win social acceptance.  Thus, this comprehensive meta-theory provides a sound 
theoretical foundation to substantiate the value of social and environmental accounting 
research because social activities participation is necessary for business to maintain their 
societal legitimacy. 
 The second study examines how corporate managers rationalize their charitable 
contributions while their corporations are concurrently facing other business-related 
social issues.  Even though Carroll (1979) hypothesizes that managers would allocate 
more resources to attend to their business –related social problems and thus have less 
resources available for philanthropy, the empirical results support the competing 
hypothesis forwarded by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975).  Dowling and Pfeffer posit that 
business-related social issues would jeopardize corporation’s social legitimacy.  Thus, 




These study findings suggest that corporations should be required to disclose all their 
social and environmental performance information along with the amount of their 
donations.  It is because the amount of money and resources donated by corporations 
seems to be associated with questionable business practices rather than an indicator of 
social friendliness, as misperceived by the public. 
 The third study analyzes the relationship between the current tax laws and the 
fulfillment of corporate foundations’ social functions.  Using data from corporate 
foundations’ tax returns, this study concludes that amendments to the current tax laws 
appear to be necessary.  Under current tax laws, corporate foundations do not carry out 
their functions to support research and public policy studies.  Moreover, although we 
should not forget the fact that corporations foundations do really give donations, 
corporations appear to use their foundations as a tool to manage their business 
environment and purchase their social legitimacy. 
 In sum, these three studies build upon prior theoretical and empirical work to 
substantiate and advance social and environmental accounting research.  The empirical 
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